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I. INTRODUCTION
"It is pardonable to be defeated.
But never to be surprised."
Frederick the Great
A. THESIS OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE
The objective of this paper is to determine how and to
what degree the Soviet Union uses the element of surprise
in their conduct of war and aggression. This paper will
additionally attempt to show, using both historical data
and case studies, that the Soviets have a "style" of fighting
that relies on the use of surprise and this "style" differs
dramatically from any other country.
There are several Soviet and American writings on surprise
attacks with nuclear weapons. It is the opinion of many high
officials, both political and military, (and one this author
subscribes to) that small-level conflicts of a non-nuclear
nature are more likely to occur than a surprise first strike
nuclear attack. The Soviet Union makes their risk assessments
based on what they call "the Correlation of Forces." This
concept takes into account many factors but the four primary
dimensions are political, economic, military and moral.
These dimensions are categorized and calculated for both the
Soviets and their prospective opponent. If the Soviets are
12
sufficiently ahead in most areas then they feel confident
that they can achieve success. If their advantage is small
or if they are behind they are inclined to wait until this
correlation changes into their favor. The use of nuclear
weapons interjects more uncertainty into the Soviet equation
than they like and decreases their chances of victory. The
present-day strategy of the Soviet Union appears to be to
accumulate such oveirwhelming numbers of nuclear weapons,
relative to the United States' nuclear arsenal, that these
weapons would be neutralized and their first strike use
extremely remote. In other words, nuclear weapons make it
safer to conduct conventional warfare. Even if nuclear
weapons were to be used, most scenarios have these weapons
being used only after a conventional attack had already
initiated the conflict. Therefore, for the purpose of this
paper all battles or wars are assumed to be conducted with
conventional ammunition and do not involve nuclear weapons.
This paper is divided into four parts: Introduction,
Historical Data Base and Analysis, Case Studies and
Conclusion. Part I begins by explaining some Soviet terms
and answering a few basic questions on what is meant by the
word "surprise". In this section the three dimensions of
Soviet surprise and how they are achieved in war are
introduced
.
In Part II, four major areas are discussed. First, why
history is important and why its lessons must be remembered
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is considered. Second, the elements of surprise, deception,
warning and preconception are examined to see how they
relate and contribute to victory in warfare. This investi-
gation is aided by empirical evidence obtained from Barton
Whaley's historical data base. Thirdly, the countries of
United Kingdom, Germany, Soviet Union and United States are
examined as to their preferences and utilization of the
above elements and other key variables, from the data base,
in an effort to establish a "style" of warfare and more
specifically a "style" in the use of surprise. There is a
tendency to explain the actions and behavior of the Soviets
as if one were actually looking at oneself in a mirror.
This practice is far too common and extremely dangerous.
The idea that the Soviets "are just like we are" is a
mistake and a misinterpretation of the Soviet "style". This
misperception is challenged in this section. It must be
remembered that the main aim of this paper is to obtain the
above styles in the case of the Soviet Union; the other
countries are only mentioned in an effort to show similarities
or differences as they relate to the Soviets. This part ends
by looking at the several reasons why the Soviets have selec-
ted the Manchurian campaign as the Soviet "model" in the use
of surprise and offensive operations.
As a study of Soviet style of surprise in Part III this
paper looks at three cases where the Soviets used surprise
as part of their political/military plans in order to achieve
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their objectives. The three cases are the Soviet invasions
of Manchuria in 1945, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan
in 1979. It is in this section that the five elements of
Soviet surprise, intention, time, place, strength, and style
are examined to see what lessons can be learned from them.
Part IV stresses the importance that the Soviet Union
places on the use of surprise. Additionally, there are
several recommendations about surprise avoidance and how a
potential victim can eliminate or at least reduce surprise
and its effects. It is in this section that the author
cautions the Western world, especially the U.S., to be ever
mindful that this potential adversary (the Soviet Union) has
used surprise very successfully in the past and continues to
write of its vast importance in modern warfare today. It is
in our national interest to remember this fact. For it is
in doing so that we take our first step in the prevention of
becoming a victim of it.
B. WHAT IS SURPRISE?
"Surprise is the harbinger of victory."
Marshal Zakharov
What is surprise? How important is it? How does one
achieve it? These three questions have been asked for
hundreds of years and have been answered in a variety of
ways by many different military strategists.
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what is surprise? Richard K. Betts in his book
Surprise Attack , states; "Surprise is defined in terms of
the defender's unreadiness caused by one or more mistaken
estimates of whether, when, where, and how the enemy would
strike." [Ref. 1] In the Soviet Military Encyclopedia the
Soviets said this about surprise: Actions unexpected by the
enemy which enhance the achievement of success in combat, in
an operation, and in war. Surprise is one of the major
principles of military art and consists of choosing the time,
procedures, and modes of combat operations which make it
possible to strike when the enemy is least prepared to ward
off a strke." [Ref. 2]
On the surface, surprise in warfare appears to be easily
understood and its importance self-evident. Therein lies a
trap, a difficulty to overcome, for surprise is a behavior
which only comes to be known, and perhaps understood almost
exclusively after it has happened.
How important is surprise? Carl Von Clausewitz in his
book On War writes: "Surprise lies more or less at the
foundation of all undertakings, for without it superiority
at the decisive point is really not conceivable." [Ref. 3]
Clausewitz goes on to say: "Surprise is not only the means
to the attainment of numerical superiority; but it is also
to be regarded as a substantive principle in itself."
[Ref. 4]
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In 350 B.C. Sun Tzu listed what he considered major and
relevant factors of war. Since that time all major military
theoreticians have established their own subjective lists.
These lists of "substantive principles" have become known
as "The Principles of War." Each author of these principles
chooses factors that they consider important. Normally these
lists are arranged so that those factors of highest importance
appear first on the list. In Barton Whaley's unpublished
book Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War , there is a
table where he summarizes twenty-four "Principles of War"
lists. He starts with Sun Tzu and works his way up to the
present. It is interesting to note that nineteen, nearly 80%,
of these authors list surprise as one of the important factors
in war. [Ref . 5]
From the above definitions of surprise and the numerous
appearances of surprise in the "Principles of War" lists, it
would seem that the importance of surprise is known implicitly.
However, it does not fully answer the question of how important
is surprise? To get a better measure of the significance of
surprise this author looked at two studies that gathered
empirical data on numerous battles and wars. These studies
were conducted in an effort to establish relationships between
the many elements that make up warfare and to see how they lead
to success in combat.
The first study was done by Barton Whaley. The data
encompasses 226 conflict situations (case studies) between the
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years 1914 to 1973. Using this data, it can be shown that
in 78% of the cases the element of surprise was used success-
fully. Additionally, when deception was used to augment a
surprise attack, a surprise attack was successfully achieved
94% of the time. Further evaluation of surprise, based on
this data base, is done in Part II of this paper.
The second study was done by Historical Evaluation and
Research Organization (HERO) . The major output of the HERO
study was the development of the Quantified Judgment Method
of Analysis of Historical Combat Data (QJMA) . This retro-
spective model was able to predict victory in eighty-one
division and corp sized engagements of World War II 9 2% of
the time. This same model, when applied to the same engage-
ments but modified to predict the winners on the basis of
Firepower and Numbers alone (leaving out the calculations
for surprise) , only had a 67% prediction rate.
As is briefly described above, surprise can be accom-
plished and it plays an important role in war. But how does
one achieve it? The concept sounds easy enough, yet all of
Part III of this paper goes into great detail on how the
Soviets achieved surprise during the three campaigns studied.
As a summary of how surprise is achieved the following two
statements may be compared. First, a Western view: "Surprise
is achieved when a sudden military action by one antagonist
has not been predicted, much less anticipated, by its intended
victim." [Ref. 6] Secondly, a Soviet view from one of the
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many articles written by Soviet military experts on the
concept of how to achieve surprise in war:
"Surprise is achieved by confusing the enemy of one's
intentions, by keeping secret the overall purpose of the
forthcoming action and its preparation; by rapid and
concealed concentration and deployment of forces in the
region of making the strike, by the unexpected use of
weapons, as well as by the use of tactical procedures
and new weapons unknown to the enemy. In other words
surprise is achieved by making strikes against the enemy
at a place and a time where he does not expect them."
[Ref. 7]
Any discussion of the Soviet military would be incomplete
if it did not include a brief explanation of what the Soviets
call "military art". To the Soviets, military art is the
application of scientific laws and principles to warfare.
Military art is broken down into three levels; strategy,
operational art, and tactics. Surprise as part of the
military art is treated in the same way. The Soviets apply
what they see as their scientific method and terminology to
the concept and define it on the same three levels. Strategic
surprise is that dimension of surprise that is accomplished
on a large scale. Strategic surprise includes both political
and military forms of deception to aid and increase the
achievement of surprise. On the political side items such
as diplomatic deception of a country's intentions are
normally essential if one is to have strategic surprise.
In a military context, strategic surprise is carried out
by appearing to support that which is done by the political
leaders while keeping controlled and secret the movement of
large amounts of troops, normally associated with a war or
19
campaign. Operational surprise is a degree lower than
strategic surprise and involves the achievement of surprise
by individual theaters of military operations. Operational
surprise takes into account items such as "misdirecting the
opponent's calculation of the time, strength, direction,
speed and manner of possible attack." [Ref. 8] Tactical
surprise is surprise achieved by operational units and
formulations. It normally encompasses the unexpected use
of weapons, or techniques not seen by one's adversary before.
Soviet Marshal Matzulenko describes surprise within this
framework as follows:
"Surprise is the product of a victim's ignorance,
preconceptions, and gullibility as well as the attacker's
ability to deceive. In Soviet military doctrine, the
attacker's success in concealing his intent and timing
yields STRATEGIC SURPRISE; misdirecting the opponent's
calculations of the time, strength, direction, speed and
manner of possible attacks, generates OPERATIONAL SURPRISE;
and TACTICAL SURPRISE derives from the unexpected weapons,
techniques and skills that are actually employed in combat."
[Ref. 9]
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II. HISTORICAL DATA BASE AND ANALYSIS: LOOKING FOR A STYLE
A. WHY USE HISTORY?
Why use history to look toward the future? V7hy use
historical data to explain or predict events in the future?
At first glance it does not seem logical to look backward
if one wants to see forward. Certainly everyone would agree
that it would be dangerous and ludicrous to drive a car on
the New York Expressway while one was facing backward. How-
ever, in the realm of world politics where the rules of
behavior are not as clearly defined as driving a car, history,
the looking backwards, can play an important role. If one
ignores the past then one forfeits the opportunity to learn
from experience. It is a fact that each generation has its
own radical leaders and crises to content with and surely
history does not repeat itself exactly. Neither does history
provide detailed guidance for daily operations to answer
political or military problems. However, what history can
do is to reveal and recommend ways and means to achieve
invaluable gains and advantages or avoid huge pitfalls. The
major reason that history should be used is its impact on all
things be they political, technological or agricultural, but
especially on the military area. Concepts may change, systems
may change, but the principle element does not change and
always will be the same, Man! The nature of change is that it
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is very often slow, and only occurs in minor details. It is
only when man adapts new technology and applies it does
warfare or any other area of study advance. Man should be
more sensitive to his important role. One way to do this is
to remember the past. Man, in order to move productively
ahead, must use the lessons that can be drawn from what prior
mankind has tried and experienced.
Two Frenchmen in the 1830 's set out on a journey. Alexis
de Tocqueville visited the United States. Marquis de Custine
visited Russia. These two Frenchmen kept journals of their
trips and when they returned to France each wrote a book.
Their works are examples of how mankind through the ages
changes very little. The systems of government may change,
grow in size and vary in style. The people, those who make
that history, change little. In the introduction to Journey
For Our Time , General Walter B. Smith who spent several years
as American Ambassador in Moscow talks about the parallels
between Custine 's Russia and that of the present day Soviet
Union. "I could have taken many pages verbatim from his
journal and after substituting present day names and dates
for those of a century ago, have sent them to the State
Department as my own official reports. V7ashington would have
found them, in complete harmony with what I had had to say
about my experiences and observations." [Ref. 10] General
Smith goes on to say that " . . the analogy between Russia of
1839 and the Soviet Union today is so striking that one must
22
pinch himself to recall that Custine was writing more than
a hundred years ago." [Ref. 11]
The main topic of this paper is the use of surprise in
warfare. Surprise is successful because of many factors
but central to the accomplishment of surprise is the percep-
tions of the intended victim. For the United States it is
troublesome to note that three major items that can contribute
to becoming a victim of a surprise attack are items that the
United States has exhibited on occasion. These items are:
(1) Not learning from past experiences. (2) The difficulty
to revise or reverse their concepts of a possible enemy even
when the evidence is available. (3) Democratic systems
produce entangled alliances which are constraining by their
nature to respond timely and with the necessary resolve to
prevent a surprise attack and minimize its effects.
The Soviet political leaders are of a different mind set
and style than most of the West. The Soviets actively use
their history and specifically their history of warfare.
They use their history to train and test ideas that have
proven successful under battlefield conditions.
The following is an example of how modern Soviet beliefs
on warfare and specifically the use of surprise have been
influenced by historical events and how these events have
shaped and developed Soviet doctrine and strategy.
The Second World War has been over for forty years and
the Soviets still see it as a laboratory where lessons on
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warfare still can be learned. A brutal lesson the Soviets
were forced to learn was taught to them by the great loss
of Soviet blood and land. The modern use of surprise was
thrust upon them when the Germans invaded on June 22, 1941.
The extremely poor showing of the Soviet troops was brought
on by the misperceptions of their leaders, especially Stalin.
To downplay this overwhelming surprise attack Stalin lowered
the importance of the element of surprise by removing it from
the Soviet's principles of war list, which Stalin called the
permanently operating factors, and assigned it to a newly
created list called transitory operating factors of which
surprise was the only member. Bitter lessons such as this
are not easily forgotten and the Soviets are determined to
never allow themselves to be surprised on such a large scale
again. This lesson from history would not be repeated. The
Soviets soon learned how effective surprise could be and
mastered its use and applied it successfully several times
before the war ended. After the war, because of Stalin's
over-sensitivity to being surprised by the Germans in 1941,
for all practical purposes surprise was removed from all
written and spoken Soviet military thought during his life-
time. It was not until 1955, two years after Stalin's
death, that World War II Soviet Tank Marshal Rotmistrov
was able to revive the issue of surprise in warfare when he
wrote his watershed article "On the Role of Surprise in
Contemporary War" . The following quotes from that article
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summarize the importance Marshal Rotmistrov places on
history and the element of surprise in war;
"The experience of history has shown that the
skillful employment of surprise brings true success,
not only in battles and operations, but also in war.
If a war starts with a surprise attack, then as a
rule it [surprise attack] essentially determines the
strategic victory in the first stage of the war and
secures the conditions for the advantageous development
of subsequent military activities." [Ref. 12]
He goes on to say;
"Thus on the basis of the experience of past wars
it is possible to assert that surprise, successfully
accomplished, not only influences the course of battles
and operations but in certain circumstances can influence
to a significant extent the course and even the outcome
of the whole war." [Ref. 13]
This theme of surprise is repeated and emphasized in more
recent Soviet writings on military doctrine and operations.
From the Soviet point of view the most glorious and
successful example of the use of surprise was the Soviet
invasion of Manchuria in 1945 at the end of World VJar II.
This success story is repeatedly cited in Soviet military
literature whenever surprise, deception or cam.ouflage are
discussed. The Manchurian campaign as a Soviet surprise
model will be covered later in this paper.
History is a looking glass toward the future. It is not
an absolute nor is it a fortune teller's crystal ball full
of answers and details. However, it is a tool that needs to
be mastered and used to achieve its fullest potential.
Historical data should aid political and military leaders
to make wiser decisions today. Behavioral trends of the past
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should influence decision on the strategy to combat present
day crisis. The people of the United States often exhibit a
"McDonald's" mind set opting for the quick fix or hurry up
solution rather than drawing upon the lessons of history.
This is a problem our rival and prospective adversary does
not have, for he conscientiously does not allow it to happen.
In 1969 Hugh Trevor-Roper, a famous Oxford historian,
was addressing an audience on the importance and relevance of
history. He summed up the subject by saying:
"We cannot profitably look foward without also
looking back." [Ref. 14]
B. THE DATA BASE
This section is based on a computerized data base of 226
battle/conflict case studies that occurred in 20 wars from
1914 to 1973. This data is taken in part from Barton Whaley's
1969 unpublished manuscript Strategem: Deception and
Surprise in War . Additional information came from a computer
tape obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) con-
taining data which adds to and corrects Whaley's data and
updates it to 1973.
The data is arranged into cases and the cases are grouped
into three categories labeled A, B, and C. Category A is
made up of cases where strategic surprise and/or strategic
deception was used (93 cases) . Category B contains cases
where tactical surprise and/or tactical deception was used
(78 cases) . Category C are cases where neither surprise
nor deception were used (59 cases)
.
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To understand Whaley's data it would be helpful to
define the terms he used. Therefore for the purposes of
this section the following definitions will apply:
SURPRISE: Surprise is achieved when a sudden military
action by one antagonist has not been pre-
dicted, much less anticipated, by its
intended victim. (Note: this is seen from
the victim's point of view and as an effect.)
DECEPTION: Deception is an act intended by its perpetra-
tor to dupe or mislead a victim. (Note: this
is seen from the user's point of view and an
active measure he undertakes)
STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL: Strategic surprise or deception is
distinguished from tactical cases by the
degree to which the military action affects
the victim's mobilization, deployment, or
grand strategy. In general, at the tactical
level surprise and deception evolves into
strategies where the locus of command shifts
from the narrow zone of battle with the field
commanders, to the point where it involves
larger areas and senior military or political
leaders are in more positive and direct control
Before looking at the results obtained from the data analysis
it is important to note that the structure of the data base
is statistically suspect. This is due in part to the selec-
tion process of the cases. Category A cases are claimed to
be an all-inclusive set and thereby obviates the need to
develop a viable sample. Additionally, categories B and C
fail to meet the fundamental requirement of randomness. The
author is well aware of these problems and for the analysis
done in this paper (frequencies, percentages, tabulations,
etc.) these problems are not applicable. For analysis such
as factor analysis and regression analysis, the results which
are obtained are not used as precise equations which produce
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final answers, but as a starting point to focus on in order
to view and develop a better understanding of which variables
contribute to the "style of surprise" of various countries
and particularly of the Soviet Union.
To ensure the validity of the results obtained, only four
countries were used: Britain, Germany, Russia and the United
States. These countries were chosen because each had data
available to make the results significant. The total data
for the remaining countries, as a group, was large but for
individual countries were statistically not significant.
These four countries together make up 67.7% of the entire
data base. (British - 47 cases, German - 47 cases, Russian -
22 cases, U.S. - 37 cases) It is interesting to note that
one can immediately get a feeling of how important surprise
and deception are to these world powers by the following
simple comparison. These four countries make up 67.7% of the
data base. Therefore, it would be logical to presume that
these four countries would make up approximately 67.7% of
each of the three case categories. This is true in A cases
(Strategic Surprise and Deception - 68.5%). However, this
is not the case in categories B and C. In B cases (Tactical
Surprise and Deception) these countries are high with 78.2%
and in C cases (No Surprise or Deception) they are low with
49.1%. What this appears to show is that these four countries
favor the use of surprise and deception. A second way to
stress this point is to compare these four countries among
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themselves and with the remaining countries as to their use
of surprise and deception. When this is done the following
conclusions are obtained. Where the four countries' cases
breakdown to 41% of A cases, 40% of B cases and 19% of C
cases, the remaining countries (9 in all) breakdown as 41% of
A cases, 19% of B cases and 40% of C cases. Simply, the "Big
Four" cases used surprise and deception 81% of the time where
the other countries only used it 60% of the time. From this
simple analysis one can see that these four countries must
view surprise as a significant asset, for what other reason
would they have for choosing to use it so many times.
C. FOUR MAJOR ELEMENTS
The effects of a surprise attack or the use of surprise
in warfare is a very difficult element to anticipate defini-
tively. Surprise for many people is a concept best understood
only after it has happened and they are victims of its effects.
It is therefore the purpose of this section to examine surprise,
using the data described above, and see what effects it does
have on warfare as an influence on the outcome of an engage-
ment, battle or war. Additionally, this section looks at the
elements of deception, warning and preconception and how they
influence both the achievement of surprise and the attainment
of victory. Finally, this section investigates whether the
choice of day or time of day an attack begins increases one's
likelihood of achieving surprise or victory.
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The structure of this section is to first address the
issues raised above in a general manner, and then specific-
ally, by looking at how the countries of Great Britain,
Germany, Soviet Union, and United States responded to the
same issues. For convenience, the four countries will be
referred to in the remainder of this paper as the "Big Four"
.
In Table 1, the four factors, surprise, deception,
warning and preconception are summarized in three categories.
The first category lists the number of occasions that these
factors were used or attempted and the associated percentage
of use to total cases (Note: there were 205 case studies
looked at) . The second category lists the percentage of
times that a factor was used and in that case surprise was
achieved. The third category lists the number of times that
a factor was used and the case ended in victory for the
initiator. Additionally, the victory to usage percentage is
calculated.
In Table 1, of the four factors described, the element
of surprise has the highest percentages of being used (77.6%)
It appears from the data that the use of surprise favorably
increased the probability of victory. In fact when surprise
was used it resulted in victory 91.8 percent of the time.
When no surprise was used defeat occurred 63 percent of the
time
.
Although the element of deception was not used as often
as the element of surprise it was used a high percentage of
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TABLE 1













1 SURPRISE 159 77.6 100 146 91.8
NO
SURPRISE 46 22.4 17 37.0
2 DECEPTION 139 67.8 93.5 125 89.9
NO
DECEPTION 66 32.2 11.8 38 57.6
3 WARNING 157 76.6 93.2 116 73.9
NO
WARNING 48 23.4 95.0 47 97.9
4 PRECONCEPTION 119 58.0 96.6 114 95.8
NO
PRECONCEPTION 86 42.0 40.4 49 57.0
Notes: 1. Total Cases = 205
2. % as a function of attempted/used.
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the time and was associated with victorious outcomes an
impressive 89.9 percent of the time. Additionally, in cases
where deception was used it increased the likelihood of
surprise being achieved to almost 94%. (A linkage between
surprise and deception will be looked at later.) An inter-
esting result that should not go unnoticed is the fact that
there were several cases where neither surprise nor deception
was used and yet a victory was achieved. However, it must
also be pointed out that with further investigation this can
be accounted for in most cases by the fact that the initia-
ting country had an overwhelming strength ratio to its
advantage
.
Warning is a peculiar element with some rather interesting
results. First, when an aggressive nation was able to achieve
the difficult task of conducting a surprise attack without
giving prior warning to its intended victim, the outcome
resulted in almost a sure victory (97.9%) . Fortunately for
the world these occurrences are rare and were only accom-
plished in less than a quarter of the cases. One would
believe that if an intended victim has received threatening
warning signals from another nation that the likelihood of
achieving a surprise attack from that country would be low
and at least sufficient to prevent defeat. However, based
on the tabulated results and supported by the case studies,
this is incorrect. In fact even though an intended victim
has received some degree of warning the initiating aggressor
still was able to achieve surprise, for in over three quarters
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of the cases where some warning was present surprise was
achieved (93.2%), and victory was accomplished 73.9 percent
of the time. Possible reasons for this result will be
examined later.
The utilization of the element of preconception is one
that either reinforces or confuses those commonly held
beliefs of a victim country in an effort to enhance the
achievement of surprise and victory. This element is very
difficult to accomplish for it takes extremely professional
governmental agencies using a normally lengthy and detailed
process of manipulation. However, if one can skillfully
exploit this element the likelihood of achieving surprise
(96.6%) and victory (95.8%) are well worth the time and
effort
.
Table 2 breaks down the information in Table 1 by
countries and each of these categories is further divided
into the outcome achieved, both victories and defeats. The
complexity of Table 2 hinders many of the unique results from
becoming readily apparent. Therefore, to bring out these
results, .the data was compiled and summarized and Table 3
was constructed. Under the category of surprise and the
column for uses, all four countries are above the data base
norm, with the Soviet Union significantly higher. However,
under victories achieved by surprise, the Soviets and




o o z o w a. H i-io z
34
TABLE 3


































Under deception all of the "Big Four" use it more than
the norm with the United States significantly higher. An
interesting result shown in the table is that even though
the Soviets used deception the least it obtained the most
from it and had a higher victory rate than the other three
countries
.
On the element of Warning and how it affects the out-
come of a conflict the four countries are paired and dia-
metrically opposed. The United Kingdom and the United
States are lower than the norm and significantly less than
Germany and the Soviets. This implies that the United
Kingdom and the United States are significantly better at
preventing their enemies from knowing their intentions
prior to an attack. This seems odd when the other two
countries are more secretive type governments and one
would expect them to be better at hiding their intentions.
But in fairness to the United Kingdom and the United States,
their intelligence services may just have been all that
much better, especially in view of the breaking of the
cipher codes Ultra by the British and Magic by the United
States. However, in spite of what appears to be a signi-
ficant advantage to the United Kingdom and the United States,
the outcome based on this category is not drastically
different. It would appear that neither the United Kingdom
nor the United States was able to capitalize on this
advantage and it may have even hindered the United Kingdom.
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Preconception, like warning, exhibits a sharp contrast
among the data for each country. The United Kingdom and
Germany are slightly below the norm while the Soviet Union
and the United States are significantly higher in the
utilization of a victim's preconceptions. All four are
normative in their victory rate when preconceptions are
used which is an extremely high average. Preconception
may be a factor to be exploited if a country wants to be
victorious or a factor to be understood and prevented if
one does not want to be defeated.
D. MORE ABOUT SURPRISE
Surprise in warfare is a multifaceted and multi-
dimensional element. It can be examined from many different
angles and perspectives. One can investigate the use of
surprise from the point of view of the country initiating
it or from the opposite view of the country who is attemp-
ting to prevent it. One can look at what causes or aids
the attainment of surprise, as was done using the results
from Tables 1, 2 and 3. Additionally, one can observe
either the effects upon the victims or the advantages to
the initiator when a surprise attack is successful.
There are but a few examples of the many ways one can
approach the difficult question of how to explain what
surprise is and what are its effects on warfare. The aim
of this section is to reduce the enormous amount of infor-
mation by focusing on the major factors of surprise and
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their effects in order to better understand surprise.
One need not count all the stars in the sky to navigate
across the vast oceans. However, one needs to know
where to look in order to find the key stars for a safe
journey. Likewise, one need not know everything about
surprise.
Some guidelines, some general concepts about surprise
could aid the political or military decision makers who
might contemplate using a surprise strategy or who are
facing a challenge from an adversary who favors the use
of surprise and must find a possible counter.
This paper does not suppose that what is presented
here would be correct for all cases and all times.
However, what is hoped is that some of these points
would be considered.
1 . The Five Elements of Surprise
There are many ways to categorize and classify the
different forms and versions of surprise. Some authors
label them "factors", some "components", still others
"dimensions". Some authors look at surprise through the
eyes of the surpriser while others are concerned with the
victim's point of view.
The one that this author found to be both concise
and convenient was the categorization used by Barton Whaley













The fundamental preferences and choices
that determine whether a given war,
campaign, or battle changes from
possibility to reality. Intention is
a precondition of the other varieties
of surprise. Additionally, could be
considered the rationale or why the
attack must occur.
Unexpectedness of time. Not knowing
when the attack will come.
Refers to the point or area threatened,
or to the direction or axis of opera-
tion. The target or where the attack
will occur.
Refers to the amount of military force
committed to the operation.
The form that the military operation
takes, the fashion in which it is
carried out. How the campaign is
accomplished, normally viewed by
looking at and comparing military
doctrines
.
No categorized listing is ever 100% clear and
precise, but the above list is simple and very easy to
work with. Its one drawback is that there are instances
where one element begins to overlap with another. There
are examples where one item could as easily be included
in one element or another. This problem was reduced here
providing a large number of examples to support any
particular surprise element. Therefore, when there was
an item in question no harm was done by the choice of
where it was grouped.
From Table 4, it can be seen that the surprise
factor PLACE is the most often used. Surprise with regard
to TIME and STRENGTH are next but a good distance behind.
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TABLE 4










INTENT 40 46 16
TIME 61 73 56
PLACE 73 75 69
STRENGTH 56 60 53
STYLE 31 25 33
Note: All numbers are percentages
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The two factors that appear to be the hardest to accomplish
and therefore the least utilized are the surprise factors
of INTENT and STYLE. As the table shows, this trend holds
for both strategic and tactical cases, with the only excep-
tions being the factor of INTENT which appears to be accom-
plished more at the strategic level than at the tactical.
Additionally, the factor of STYLE was slightly easier to
accomplish at the tactical level vice the strategic.
What factor of surprise was used the most is important
but one needs to know when these factors are used and what
are their outcomes in conflict. Table 5, covers part of this
question and shows how the "Big Four" fare in relation to the
use of these factors and the percentage of the time their use
contributed to a victorious outcome. The overall average any
factor is victorious for any country is about 43% of the time.
From this generalization it can be seen that the factors of
TIME, PLACE and STRENGTH exceeded this average for almost all
countries. For STYLE they are all well below average while
for INTENT German and Soviet are at the average while the
United Kingdom and the United States are well below.
The United States data points to two unique observa-
tions. One, the factor PLACE for the United States is
significantly high and has given victorious results 73.3%.
Secondly, it appears that the United States was not very
successful in obtaining victories when using the surprise
factor of INTENT for its score for this factor is the
lowest in the table.
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TABLE 5
VICTORIOUS USE OF THE FACTORS OF SURPRISE BY COUNTRY
FACTOR OF
SURPRISE UK GERM SOV
1
US 1





PLACE 59.6 44.2 57.1 73.3
STRENGTH 40.4 34.9 47.6 53.3
STYLE 25.5 30.2 23.8 23.3 i
1
Note: All numbers are percentages,
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At this point a caution must be made. It is very
rare that any factor of surprise was used by itself, most
appear with one or more other factors together. Table 6,
shows this fact. From the table it becomes obvious that
the more factors of surprise one accomplishes the higher the
likelihood of victory there is.
When one or more factors of surprise were used
victory was achieved 90.8%. For two or more it went to
9 3.9% and for three and above it was nearly a sure victory
(98.2%)
.
Uses of the factors of surprise broke down by
countries as follows. The United States used two factors
43% of the time compared to about 26% for the other countries.
Conversely, for three factors used the United States was low
at 17% while the other countries were about 30%. Use of two
or more factors by the United Kingdom was low with 62% of
the time and the other countries were about 74% . For three
or more the Soviet achieved this almost half of the time while
the other countries could only get slightly over one third.
It should be noted that the Soviets when they did use 3 or
more factors of surprise were able to achieve victory 100% of
the time
.
Earlier in this section the four factors of surprise,
deception, warfare, and perception were discussed and were
summarized in Table 1. Table 7 is more detailed on the
element of surprise and outcome and is broken down by speci-
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section covers surprise and in three subsections surprise
is looked at in regard to victory and defeat.
From the table it can be seen that the Soviets use
surprise the most 90.5% but when it came to translating that
into victories they are rather lower on the list. Where all
countries seem able to gain a victory without the use of
surprise the Soviets in their attempts were unsuccessful.
Another reason implied in this data for why the Soviets lean
to the use of surprise is simply that when they use it, they
win and when they do not, they lose.
A caution must be noted for the United States. A
high victory average can be detrimental by giving one a false
sense of security. There are too many stories where the
underdog beat the favored champion. The likely adversary,
the Soviets, do not have such a bad victory average themselves
(81%).
E. DECEPTION: DOES IT AID SURPRISE?
The above sections and tables seem to indicate that the
achievement of surprise in warfare is extremely important to
increase the probability of a successful outcome. Addition-
ally, it has been shown that several elements such as deception,
warning and preconception aid in the achievement of surprise.
It also has been shown that as the intensity of surprise
increases or as the number of various factors of surprise
increase so does the likelihood of success directly affected.
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Earlier in this paper it was suggested that deception
aids in the achievement of surprise and surprise was a
stepping stone to victory. If this is true then how much
deception is needed? Is there an optimum number of deceptive
ruses needed to achieve surprise? This paper up to this
point has looked extensively at surprise and victory. The
importance of deception will now be examined. There are
several questions that need to be answered. First, is there
an optimal number of deceptive ruses and ploys that when
attempted would increase the probability of surprise being
achieved? The data in Table 8 shows the relationship between
deceptive ruses and the achievement of surprise. The numbers
in this table reflect only strategic cases. This was done
for two reasons. One, the data was clearer and therefore
easier to obtain for the strategic cases. Two, as has been
briefly seen in passing from the previous tables and a fact
that will be looked at closer later, there appears to be no
significant difference between levels of conflict, strategic
and tactical, when it comes to factors like surprise and
deception. Even though the means of accomplishment are
different, the goal of victory and the effects they cause
are very similar. Therefore, one can make some inferences
about all cases by only looking at one level. From Table 8
it is shown that the optimal threshold for achieving surprise
is between two and three deceptive ruses
.
A second question that needs to be answered, especially




Number of Deceptive Ruses
1 2 3 4 5 6
NO
SURPRISE - - 6.5 - -
SURPRISE - 2.2 49.5 21.5 12.9 7.5 -
Note: All numbers are percentages
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ruses used relate to the success of several factors of
surprise? As was seen above from Table 8, 2-3 ruses are
significant to ensure surprise and as was shown from Table
6, 2-3 factors of surprise are significant to ensure victory.
It would be logical to conclude that deception does contribute
highly when combined with surprise. However, from Table 9
one gets a clear picture of how the intensity of surprise is
effected by the number or intensity of deceptive ruses used.
As can be seen from the table when no deceptive ruses were
used 72.6% of the cases were unable to achieve surprise. One
would expect the more deceptive ruses used the greater the
intensity of element of surprise would be. To a degree this
is true. When between one and four ruses were used a higher
level of surprise was able to be accomplished but beyond
four ruses the gains are minimal. Unless one is trying to
achieve a significantly higher level of surprise (4-5 factors),
what may be gained in the trying is lost in the warning and
increased response capability given to the intended victim.
It would therefore appear the most effective combination of
deceptive ruses used to surprise factors attempted would be
2-3 ruses for 2-3 factors of surprise. This would ensure a
high probability of a successful outcome.
When a Pearson correlation was conducted on all variables
of the data base, surprise and deception received one of the
highest correlation ratings of (.64).
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TABLE 9





1-4 5 or more
72.6 6.4 6.3
1 8.2 11.6 6.3
2 9.6 41.0 18.7
3 5.5 29.4 12.5
A-5 4.1 11.6 56.2
Note: All numbers are percentages,
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F. OTHER ELEMENTS
There are four other questions that must be addressed
before the individual "styles" of the countries can be
examined. First, does the impact of surprise, deception
and warning vary significantly on the outcome of a conflict
if the level of that conflict is strategic or tactical in
nature? As one can see from Table 10 in all but one of
eight categories all the results are alike for both strategic
and tactical cases, and in most they are virtually the same.
The only exception is in the tactical column where the use
of deception is lower. However, in view of all the data that
is present this is not thought to be a large disparity and
this author feels that in respect to the use of surprise,
deception and warning there are no real differences between
their application in strategic or tactical uses. An inter-
esting preview of the "Big Four" styles is shown in Table 11.
From the table one can see that both the United Kingdom and
United States have better success winning tactical battles than
they do for winning strategic campaigns. The reverse is true
for the Germans and Soviets, for they are both strategically
undefeated while only about 75% successful in their tactical
battles
.
A second question that remains concerns the possibility
of patterns in the use of a particular day of the week. Are
there days where victory or surprise are achieved more? Are
there days that should be avoided because it would appear that
it was a disadvantage to use them? Table 12 shows a daily
51
TABLE 10








40 78,4 119 78.3
SURPRISE
VICTORY
37 92.5 109 91.6
DECEPTION
USED
40 78.4 99 65.1
DECEPTION
VICTORY
35 87.4 90 90.9
NO WARNING 12 23.5 36 23.7
NO WARNING
VICTORY
12 100 35 97.2
WARNING 39 76.5 116 76.3
WARNING
VICTORY
30 76.9 86 74.1








UK 60 81 79
GERM 100 79 84
SOV 100 73 81
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breakdown as to the number of times a particular day was used
to initiate a battle and how each day stands in respect to
outcome and surprise. The table shows that there is no
individual day which stands out as the singularly most often
used day. The average amount any one day was used was 14.3
percent, with the range being only between 10.1% and 18.5%.
It appears that every day has been used almost equally.
Monday and Sunday are slightly higher in their use while
Wednesday and Friday being slightly lower. The other days
are grouped together at the norm. When one looks at Table 12
to see what day was more likely to result in a victory or a
defeat there is almost a complete polarization among the days
It appears that Thursday (92%) and Friday (90%) are two days
where on the average victory occurred 91% of the time. While
all of the other five days, victories were at a much level
(74%) . When one looks at the data on surprise an even more
pronounced separation occurs. Friday (95%) is the most suc-
cessful day with Thursday (88%) and Wednesday (82%) close
behind. Where the average for surprise utilization for these
three days is 89% the other four days only average about 69%.
Table 13 is a further breakdown of Table 12 and cross
tabulates the days of the week with how outcome (victory and
defeat) and surprise (used and not used) interrelate. This
table again shows that for most attacks, regardless of the
day on which they occur, if surprise was used the outcome
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that victories do occur without surprise and conversely
defeats occur with surprise. However, for both of these
combinations they happen less than ten percent of the time.
To see if any of the "Big Four" countries showed a
preference and/or an abnormally high success rate in regard
to days of the week, Tables 14 and 15 were developed.
The following daily profiles for each country can be
gleaned from these tables; The British appear to favor no
particular day and utilize the days equally with Monday only
a slight favorite. However, on Monday as well as Tuesday
the British have their lowest success rate. Thursday provides
their highest. For Germany Sunday is favored, followed by
equal use of Friday, Tuesday and Monday. However, only Friday
brings them high success. The Soviets, more so than any other
country, favor the use of two particular days; Thursday
followed by Sunday. Between these two days almost two thirds
of all Soviet cases were conducted. A second interesting
outcome of the data is Soviet non-use of Wednesday, and non- •
victories on Monday. The Soviets success rate is perfect
four of the other five days and 80% on the remainder.
The United States prefers to use Thursday and Monday
followed by Tuesday. The United States, like the Soviets,
do not like to attack on Wednesday, nor Sunday, maybe with
good reason, for these days brings poor results.
One final note on the choice of day for attack. Where
a lot has been written on the concept of using the weekend


































































































































































both Saturday and Sunday are rather low on the attainment
of either of these objectives and, strikingly, Friday and
Thursday come out to be the two days where surprise and
victory are most often obtained
«
After looking at days to see if the use of one is more
advantageous than another the next logical area to explore
is the choice of time or time period where victory or
surprise may be more likely to occur. Tables 16 and 17 do
just that. To simplify the tables the results were grouped
into three time periods. Night or Dawn (2200-0559), Morning
(0600-1359) , and Afternoon (1400-2159) . From Table 16 one
sees that overall' the night time period is used significantly
more than the other two yet the attainment of victory is
almost equally probable in any of the three time periods.
These results change slighly when the data of the "Big Four"
is compared. The United Kingdom and Germany follow this
night time trend while the Soviets and the United States
favor the morning time period and with much more success.
With the exception of Germany the other three countries have
both a lower use rate and a significantly lower victory rate
during the afternoon time period.
Two additional points to come out from Table 17 are:
First, the fact that more than half of the cases that used
surprise tried it during the night time period. When surprise
was not chosen to be used the attack time appears to shift to
the morning period. Looking at the time period in relation-
ship to victory or defeat one finds that of all victorious
60
TABLE 16































VICTORY 82.7 87.0 61.5
Note: All numbers are percentages,
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TABLE 17
TIME PERIODS; SURPRISE & OUTCOME
SPECIFIC
CASES NIGHT MORNING AFTERNOON TOTAL
SURPRISE




23.7 57.9 18.4 100
VICTORY
CASES 60 32 8 100
DEFEAT
CASES 54 34 12 100
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cases 60% of them occurred at night and likewise 54% of
all defeats occured at night.
Another element that needs to be examined is the relation-
ship between the force strength of opposing countries and
the use of surprise. Barton Whaley explains in his book that
it is popularly believed that the force ratio for successful
attack is 3:1 superiority. The data shows that without the
use of surprise this force ratio for success was closer to
2:1 and supports the belief that the more force one has the
greater the success. From Table 18, one can see that with the
input of surprise in the force ratio equation the relationship
between force and success is altered. The reason for this is
that surprise has the effect of being "a force multiplier"
[Ref. 15] and geometrically shifts the advantage to the side
who uses it. '
G. A PREVIEW OF SOVIET "STYLE"
What is the Soviet style of conducting a war in the
initial phase of that war and particularly in their use of
surprise?
One often reads about the Soviet paranoia about their
security and the importance placed on the protection and
defense of the homeland from the invasion of the Capitalist
countries. It is difficult to believe that a country with
the present day military might and capability that the Soviets
have at their disposal would still cling to this notion. But
might this be part of their style? One does not have to go
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TABLE 18
FORCE USED TO GAIN OBJECTIVES AFTER WWI
SURPRISE NO SURPRISE
OUTCOME # FORCE RATIO // FORCE RATIO
VICTORY 18 1.2:1 1 2.5:1
ABOUT AS PLANNED 28 1.1:1 4 1.4:1
BELOW
EXPECTATION 17 1.4:1 9 1.4:1
DEFEAT 4 1.0:1 20 0.9:1
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too far back in history to see this fear and style exhibited.
The following are three recent events that involved the Soviet
Union seem to point to a prevailing style. About two years
ago on 1 September 19 83 the Soviet Union scrambled fighters
to investigate an unidentified air contact that was in Soviet
airspace. From open sources, although not conclusive, it
appears that the Soviets intentionally shot down Korean
Airlines, KL-007, knowing it was an unarmed civilian aircraft.
The plane was destroyed with the loss of all aboard.
In April of the next year the Soviet head of air defense
force evaluated this event in Pravda by saying:
"The termination of the provocation prepared by
American special services using a South Korean
aircraft . . . was a historical example of the air
defense high level of readiness to perform their
military duty." [Ref. 16]
The rhetoric from the Soviet political leaders still
stressed peaceful coexistence. The Western world was shocked
and called it murder.
In March of of this year an unarmed American officer autho-
rized to be where he was and in full compliance with legal
international agreement was shot and left to die while medical
aid could have been rendered. The dead officer was Army Major
Arthur Nicholson. In a day where spying is so sophisticated
and common place the fact that an act out of a novel or action
movie could be accomplished in real life is almost unbelievable
The Soviets call him a spy. The United States called it murder
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In April of this year in a local Sunday paper the
editorial story "Soviet Military Instruction" was featured.
In the article the author tells of a teacher who heroically
gave his life for his student. He was killed when he fell
on top of a live hand grenade in an effort to absorb its
effects. However, this was not a battlefield. This was a
Middle School classroom in which students were receiving
mandatory military instruction. Unfortunately a live grenade
was mixed in with inert training grenades. The article goes
on to say:
"The children's manual which teaches 'hatred for the
enemies of Socialism' , also teaches assembly of machine
guns and the use of bayonets and rifle butts in the
'decisive armed conflict of the two opposing world
systems', a conflict that will involve 'vast casualties
on an unprecedented scale'" [Ref. 17]
Scholars would have us believe that what one teaches our
young people today will become their moral fiber and essence
of tomorrow. How different are the lessons Soviet children
receive. How different are the fibers that make up Soviet
thought. There can not be any question, in view of these
events and others like them, that Soviet thought is funda-
mentally different from Western thinking. Yet there are
signs that the Soviets have taken lessons from other countries
The military of the Soviet Union, especially its army, is
viewed as one of massive size and force with little
flexibility. This could not be further from the truth.
Soviet doctrine stresses mobility and destroying the enemy's
will as well as his means to fight. The Soviets learned that
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lesson the hard way from the Germans Blitzkrieg in
World War II.
A point that commonly appears in articles about the arms
race between the United States and the USSR, is how the
development of the Soviet Armed forces, both army and navy
parallel the United States in construction and tactics. If
one compares the "Big Four" from the data presented in the
last section it appears that in many factors the Soviet are
extremely close in their behavior with that of the Germans
and in others they are very similar to the United States.
Later in this section we will examine this aspect more closely.
It is interesting to note that much of modern Soviet
doctrine can find its bases from two primary sources. The
first comes from Germany, a nation whom she soundly defeated
in World War II or from the United States, a nation whom she
is struggling with today and who well might be her opponent
in the next world war.
The Soviets attach great importance to the initial phase
of a war. To them it is a pivotal period and all other actions
are consequences of what is done there. This fact helps ex-
plain the keen interest that the Soviets have in factors such
as surprise and deception and the use of rapid mobility to
take advantage of the effects achieved by these factors.
The Soviet philosophy of being ready, in all respects, before
a conflict starts is an important idea the West would do well
to remember. For in today's high-tech society and with
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weapons of massive fire power if one is not ready at the
start of a conflict there may not be time to produce or even
mobilize reserves before the conflict gets beyond a country's
ability to salvage the situation. This "ready now" philosophy
also aids in taking advantage to the maximum, extent possible
the gains achievable in the initial phase of hostilities. It
seems logical to say that part of the Soviet style and strategy
would have to incorporate a highly mobile fighting force that
uses deception in order to achieve surprise during the initial
period of the war.
H. AN ANALYSIS OF "THE STYLE OF SURPRISE"
In an effort to discern what makes up the Soviet style
and to see what particular variable contributes to it, several
methods were tried. How this style relates to styles of other
countries was also examined. The following four procedures
were accomplished:
1) The data from all the previous tables were separated by
countries and country summary sheets were developed.
2) From these country summary sheets a "Big Four" composite
and graphic display presentation was made.
3) Taking the data for the elements of surprise, deception
and warning, for the "Big Four" countries, these three elements
were plotted together. Two graph types were drawn, one used
the element's percentage of times it was used, and the second
used the element's victory achieved percentage. After these
graphs were drawn some very interesting outcomes were evident.
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The author calls these plots, Surprise-Deception-VJarning
(SDW) "biorhythms" because of their similarity to human
biorhythms involving the three factors, emotional (E)
,
physical (P) and intellectual (I) . Their statistical
value, just as the reality of their counterpart, are
questionable, but this is another way to view and see
graphically a difficult concept.
4) In order to see if any pattern might be developed from
the variables of the data base, these variables were put
through a process of factor analysis. From the final output
of this analysis those variables which loaded heavily in the
primary factors were further subjected to regression analysis






The country summary sheets. Tables 19-22, are self
explanatory. From them one can find things such as which
factors of surprise are preferred by a country, as well as
how much a country used surprise, deception and warning.
One can also find out the day of the week or time of day a
country prefers to initiate an attack or are the most
victorious.
2 Composite Graphic
The utility of the composite graphic. Table 23, is
to compare the Soviets with the other countries with an eye





1. FACTOR OF SURPRISE MOST USED:
2. NR. OF FACTORS OF SURPRISE:
a. 1 or more used:
b. 2 or more used:
c. 3 or more used:
d. 1 or more used. victory:
e. 2 or more used. victory:
f
.














4. DAY(S) PREFERRED TO ATTACK:
5. DAY(S) MOST VICTORIOUS:
6. DAY(S) AVOIDED:
7. DAY(S) LEAST VICTORIOUS:
8. TIME PERIOD PREFERRED:
9. TIME PERIOD MOST VICTORIOUS:
10. SURPRISE USED:
11. SURPRISE USED & VICTORY:
12. DECEPTION USED:
13. DECEPTION USED & VICTORY:
14. WARNING USED:
15. WARNING USED & VICTORY:
16. PRECONCEPTION USED:
17. PRECONCEPTION USED & VICTORY:
18. VICTORY WITH SURPRISE PER TOTAL CASES:
19. VICTORY WITH DECEPTION PER TOTAL CASES:
20. VICTORY WITH WARNING PER TOTAL CASES:
21. VICTORY WITH PRECONCEPTION PER TOTAL CASES:
THURSDAY (36%) & SUNDAY (29%)
FRI, SAT, SUN, TUESDAY (100%)
WEDNESDAY (0%)





































FACTOR OF SURPRISE MOST USED:
NR. OF FACTORS OF -SURPRISE:
a. 1 or more used:
b. 2 or more used:
c. 3 or more used:
d. 1 or more used, victory:
e. 2 or more used, victory:























TIME PERIOD MOST VICTORIOUS:
SURPRISE USED:
SURPRISE USED & VICTORY:
DECEPTION USED:
DECEPTION USED & VICTORY:
WARNING USED:
WARNING USED & VICTORY:
PRECEONCEPTION USED:
PRECONCEPTION USED & VICTORY:
VICTORY WITH SURPRISE PER TOTAL CASES:
VICTORY WITH DECEPTION PER TOTAL CASES:
VICTORY WITH WARNING PER TOTAL CASES:
VICTORY WITH PRECONCEPTION PER TOTAL CASES:
SUNDAY (24%)
WED, THUR, FRIDAY (100%)




















1. FACTOR OF SURPRISE MOST USED: PLACE
2. NR. OF FACTORS OF SURPRISE;
a. 1 or more used:
b. 2 or more used:
c. 3 or more used:
d. 1 or more used, victory:
e. 2 or more used, victory:











4. DAY(S) PREFERRED TO ATTACK: THUR & MON (22%)
5. DAY(S) MOST VICTORIOUS: TUE, FRI, SATURDAY (100%)
6. DAY(S) AVOIDED: WED (4%) & SUN (7%)
7. DAY(S) LEAST VICTORIOUS: WEDNESDAY (0%)
8. TIME PERIOD PREFERRED: MORNING (52%)
9. TIME PERIOD MOST VICTORIOUS: MORNING (93%)
10. SURPRISE USED: 83%
11. SURPRISE USED & VICTORY: 92%
12. DECEPTION USED: 80%
13. DECEPTION USED & VICTORY: 92%
14. WARNING USED: 63%
15. WARNING USED & VICTORY: 79%
16. PRECONCEPTION USED: 77%
17. PRECONCEPTION USED & VICTORY: 96%
18. VICTORY WITH SURPRISE PER TOTAL iCASES : 77%
19. VICTORY WITH DECEPTION PER TOTAL CASES
:
73%
20. VICTORY WITH WARNING PER TOTAL CASES: 50%























FACTOR OF SURPRISE MOST USED:
NR. OF FACTORS OF SURPRISE;
a. 1 or more used:
b. 2 or more used:
c. 3 or more used:
d. 1 or more used, victory:
e. 2 or more used, victory:
f
.






























TIME PERIOD MOST VICTORIOUS:
SURPRISE USED:
SURPRISE USED & VICTORY: 89%
DECEPTION USED: 72%
DECEPTION USED & VICTORY; 88%
WARNING USED: 57%
WARNING USED & VICTORY: 67%
PRECONCEPTION USED: 51%
PRECONCEPTION USED & VICTORY: 100%
VICTORY WITH SURPRISE PER TOTAL CASES: 70%
VICTORY WITH DECPETION PER TOTAL CASES; 64%
VICTORY WITH WARNING PER TOTAL CASES: 38%
VICTORY WITH PRECONCEPTION PER TOTAL CASES: 51%
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striking similary it was noted in the far right column with
what country the Soviets appear to be similar to. The Soviets
appear to be like the Germans in the following five areas:
(1) In the use of surprise and in the intensity of surprise.
(2) In their use of both deception and warning. (3) In their
ability to prevent warning. (4) When it comes to victory
percentage, both strategic and tactical cases, they are
virtually the same. (5) These countries are parallel in
victory percentage in relationship to their use of surprise
and deception, plus their ability to win in spite of their
opponents having received some warning. The Soviet parallel
the Americans in three areas. (1) They both seem to use,
avoid, and win on the same days. (2) When they initiate
attacks they are victorious and prefer to start during the
morning period (0600-1400) . (3) Both the Soviets and the
United States take great advantage of using one's enemy's
preconceptions to achieve victorious outcomes.
3 . Surprise-Deception-Warning (SDW) Biorhythm
The SDW biorhythm graphs. Tables 24-29, come up with
an interesting result. For when these three key factors of
surprise, deception and warning are plotted graphically those
of the United States and the United Kingdom are almost parallel
in design while those of the Soviets and Germans are equally
similar in their design. A simple look at similar styles, i.e.
the German-Soviet V-style and the United Kingdom and the






































































































The purpose of conducting a factor analysis was
to reduce the 41 variables available in the data base, (for
variables list see Table 30) , to a smaller and more manageable
number and to identify those key variables that were repre-
sentative of the major trends in the data. For the factor
analysis an orthogonal rotation method was used to group
variables into separate factors where little correlation
between the factors existed. This method was chosen in order
to adhere to one of the prime rules for using the results
obtained later in regression analysis.
On early execution of the factor analysis all
variables were used with the exception of those variables
that were determined not to be vital to the analysis. These
were variables that either were administrative or organiza-
tional in nature (i.e. case number) or were data not statis-
tically conducive to factor analysis (i.e. code number of
operation) . From the results of this early analysis three
more variables were dropped (NRDOC, NRDOUBLE, NROTHER)
because of their very low appearance in the data cases
.
Table 31 is a partial summary of the factor analysis done
using 38 variables. This analysis produced 15 factors with
a cumulative percentage of 78%. When all factors were
plotted based on their eigen values a clear and distinctive
separation occurred after the sixth factor. After this






















DATA BASE VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
DESCRIPTION
Sequential case identification number
Name of country that initiated the attack
Name of country that is the target of
the attack (victim)
Number of times victim went on alert
and attack never materialized





Ratio of initiator's strength to
victim's strength
Phase of a conflict during which a
battle occurred
Environment
The overall posture of the initiator
of an attack
Ratio of initiator's casualties to
victim's casualties
Days from D-Day that the casualty
figure represents
Territory lost or won
Days from D-Day that the territorial
change represents
Victor or defeat (initiator)


























Hour of preliminary artillery
Day of week battle took place
Natural weather conditions
Artificial weather conditions (ECM)
Number of types of surprise used
Intensity of surprise
Victim's preconceptions used
Initiator successful in using
preconceptions of victim
Intention factor of surprise
Time factor of surprise
Place factor of surprise
Strength factor of surprise
Style factor of surprise
Number of time initiator demonstrated/
held military exercises or mobilizations
Number of false attacks
Negotiation used as a ruse
False documents used
Leakage of deceptive information through
the press/media
Rumors used
Total number of ruses used
Camouflage used
Deceptive information given on military
radio
Double agents used
Other types of ruses used
84
TABLE 31
RESULTS OF 38 VARIABLE FACTOR ANALYSIS
FACTORS
























CUM PCT 14.1 23.3 30.2 36.6 42.2 47.5 51.6 55.5
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remaining factors below this break contribute significantly
less.
As can be seen from Table 31, factor number one
are all variables associated with deception. As one continues
to review the factors one can see that the five factors of
surprise are poorly represented in the first eight factors.
In order to see if the mere number (12) of deception variables
so out weighted the surprise variables another factor analysis
was done. Taking the 21 variables listed in Table 31 as a
starting point factor NR 1 variables (except the general
variable of deception NDECP) were removed. The surprise
variables plus two deception variables (NRCAM, RDEM) showed
promise as being important variables but were overshadowed
by other deception variables. Finally, 15 variables were
selected and a factor analysis conducted. The results are
shown in Table 32. Seven factors were produced which yielded
a cumulative percentage of 71%, a little better output as
compared to the original 15 factors on 78% cumulative percent.
When the factors were plotted by their eigen values a clear
break showed up this time after the third factor.
When one compares Table 31 with Table 32 many
similarities can be seen. For example, factor number two in
Table 31 is almost identical with factor number one in Table
32. Factor number seven in Table 31 is identical with factor
number three in Table 32. With these similarities and the
placement of where the significant breaks occurred in the
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TABLE 32
RESULTS OF 15 VARIABLE FACTOR ANALYSIS
FACTORS
















CUM PCT 16.3 30.4 41.2 49.8 57.8 64.7 71.4
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eigen value plots, a composite factor grouping consisting of
two tables (31 and 32) was accomplished and shown as Table 33,
Table 33 shows what appears to be eight key
factors which can explain about 75-80% of what make up modern
warfare. A summary of the eight factors and what they repre-
sent follow:
Factor one is a grouping of variables that are all related
to deception and the attempt by a country to actively mis-
inform an intended victim.
Factor two is made up of surprise related variables and
preconception variables which, as was shown earlier, help
significantly to achieve surprise.
Factor three is the warning variable.
Factor four is the outcome variable.
Factor five and six can be grouped together as different
ways to describe a country's doctrine or the theoretical
manner in which they conduct war and war related politics.
Factor seven is the relationship of the hostile parties
involved in a conflict.
Factor eight is a grouping of deception variables which
are used in an effort to hide one's intentions and physical
capabilities from one's enemy.
At this stage these 22 variables were linked one
last time prior to being subject to regression analysis. It
was determined that only 18 of the 22 variables were suited

































STYLE - POLITICAL/MILITARY MANNER
& DOCTRINE
RELATIONSHIP OF HOSTILE PARTIES
DECEPTION
(HIDE & KEEP SECRET INTENTIONS)
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was dropped due to its high correlation with NCONCEPT
.
Additionally, NOUTCCME was used as the dependent variable
in the regression equation. NCONCEPT expressed a variable
that represents an input used prior to the final outcome
was known, where NSUCCEED was only known after the outcome
was available. The fourth variable NPLACE was dropped due
to relatively low position in a factor that is already
represented by three other variables,
b. Regression Analysis
VJar is initiated and conducted in different ways
by various countries . The outcome of their efforts are a
function of many variables. From the factor analysis there
appears to be 8 factors and about 20 variables that are
involved in most conflict/war-like action. The aim of this
section is to see if these variables or any combination of
these variables are significant and to show by country what
variables contribute to a country's final outcome in battle.
This information together with the country summary sheets
already discussed will give a good insight into what makes
up a country's "style" of fighting.
Table 34 is the results obtained from several
regression analyses which had as their dependent variable,
NOUTCOME. The variable NINIT 1 was used to be able to select
data by country and the 18 variables from the composite
factor analysis (see Table 33) . As can be seen from the
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six, two and four significant variables appear in their
respective regression equation. The Soviets had a high of
ten variables in their equation. The interesting thing to
note is that the value of the F statistic for the four equa-
tions are all significant but for the United Kingdom, Germany
and the United States R-square is only about .45, whereas
for the Soviets R-square is .93. What this means is that all
the equations accurately reflect the data for each country.
However, in the three equations for the United Kingdom,
Germany and the United States the variables only explain
about 45% of the dependent variable outcome achieved by those
countries. In the Soviet's case these ten variables listed
account for almost all the values of the dependent variable
(93%) .
At this point all other countries were put aside
and the rest of the analysis was done on the Soviet data.
As a matter of practice it is not desirable to have too many
variables in a regression model. In an effort to reduce the
number of variables to only those variables that make an
important contribution to the effectiveness of the equation
a step wise regression of the ten Soviet variables was
accomplished and the results are tabulated in Table 35.
Using this method one can objectively access the magnitude
of the mathematical relationship among the variables and see
how each individual variable is affected by the inclusion of
another variable into the equation. Key points to look for
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significant t-statistic (normally > 2)
,
plus an increase
variable contribution showing up normally in an increase
in either or both R-square and the F-statistic.
As can be seen the variables RDEM, NDECP, NRPRESS
violate these principles as their variable weight value changes
significantly as other variables are added plus they add little
contribution to the regression equation:
RDEM R-square .36 - .39 F-statistic 10.9 - 5.2
NDECP R-square .44 - .45 F-statistic 4.0 - 2.8
NRPRESS R-square .68 - .68 F-statistic 4.3 - 3.4
These variables were dropped and another stepwise
regression was conducted using the remaining seven variables.
The results are shown in Table 36. Where the ten variables
had a R-square of .93, this seven variable regression equation
had a R-square of .77. The same process conducted with Table
35 was done to Table 36.
Four additional variables showed signs of weak
contribution to the regression equation:
NCONCEPT R-square .36 - .44 F-statistic 10.90 - 6.24
NINTENT R-square .44 - .49 F-statistic 6.24 - 4.88
NRRADIO R-square .66 - .70 F-statistic 6.82 - 6.00
NVICT 1 R-square .77 - .77 F-statistic 6.63 - 5.21
These four variables were dropped and a three
variable regression analysis was conducted with the results
being shown in Table 37. R-square for this three variable
equation was .71, a figure which is quite significant when
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TABLE 37
SOVIET STEPWISE REGRESSION (3 VARS)

















Note: Numbers in bracket = t-scores.
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This three variable equation, consisting of:
(1) TIMECHG, which represents the number of times D-day was
postponed or advanced from the original attack plan. (2)
NRRUMOR, which represents whether or not the Soviets used
disinformation in the form of rumors prior to and during an
engagement. (3) NRCAM, which represents whether or not the
Soviets employed the use of camouflage prior to and during
and engagement. These three variables can be used to cor-
rectly forecast the outcome of a Soviet battle 71% of the
time. However this equation, its variables and the assuma-
tions about the data base needs to be further researched,
especially to see if values for these variables can be
accurately established and outcomes determined prior to a
Soviet crisis. This problem is beyond the scope of this
paper and probably its classification, but the author believes
that a solution is possible and would recommend one starting
by looking at how the Soviets calculate what they call the
"Correlation of Forces".
As a check of the accuracy of this model the 19
Soviet cases where surprise and/or deception was used were
re-examined and the values for these variables for each case
were applied to this model. The results were that in 18 of
the 19 cases for a 94.7% accuracy rate. Additionally, even
if one includes C types cases where information on the
variables was not applicable or was not available the outcome
was still predicted correctly a high and accuracy percentage
of the time (85.7%)
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5 . Further Investigation
Additional investigation was conducted of these three
variables because of the significant results produced by both
the three variable regression equation plus the results of its
application to the case studies. From the equation it appears
the variable time change by far has the biggest impact on the
final outcome.
Table 38 shows how well the "Big Four" were able to
conduct their attacks as scheduled. The Soviets were the
best at getting their attack off on time in more than half
of the cases. If one takes a range about D-Day of +1 to -1,
the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States only get
their attacks off close to schedule about 73% of the time.
The Soviets accomplish this almost 91% of the time. This
figure seems to support the idea that the Soviets are precise
in their approach to all matters including warfare and use
their time schedules faithfully.
Table 39 reduces Table 38 to three categories of
time changes: on schedule, behind schedule, or ahead of
schedule. This table further supports the previous supposi-
tion that the Soviets are rarely late (18.1%) where the
other three countries are all late about 50% of the time.
Additionally, in over a quarter of the Soviet attacks, they














-2 2 4.3 1 2.1 1 4.5
-1 3 6.4 2 4.3 5 22.7 2 5.4
22 46.8 20 42.6 12 54.5 16 43.2
1 12 25.5 11 23.4 3 13.6 8 21.6
2 7 14.9 3 6.4 1 4.5 5 13.5
3 1 2.1 4 10.8
4 or more 10 21.3 2 5.4
TOTAL 47 100 47 100 22 100 37 100
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TABLE 39
SCHEDULE CHANGE SUMMARY BY COUNTRY
TIMECHG UK GERM SOV U.S.
DELAYED 42.6 51.6 18.1 51.4
ON TIME 46.8 42.6 54.5 43.2
AHEAD 10.6 6.4 27.2 5.4
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
Note: All numbers are percentages,
100
From Table 40 two observations can be made. First,
it appears that it is not an advantage to be on time if one
wants to achieve surprise. Second, it would also appear if
one is not going to be on schedule and wants to maximize his
chance of achieving surprise one should attack ahead of
schedule. When one combines this second observation with
the fact that the Soviets have attacked early in over a
quarter of their cases it once again supports the theme of
the Soviet style utilizing the element of surprise wherever,
however and whenever possible.
When further investigation was done on the other two
variables, NRCAM and NRRUMOR nothing as striking, as was for
the variable TIMECHG, was found in either the relationship to
the Soviets or the other three countries. However, the
Soviets place great importance on deception and the achieve-
ment of surprise as is evident by these elements being sighted
in many of Soviet writings on military operations. Camouflage
and misinformation techniques are continuously mentioned as
means to accomplish these items.
I. THE MANCHURIAN MODEL
"We are taking into consideration the lessons
of the past and we are doing everything

















Note: All numbers are percentages,
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During the last month of the Second World War the Soviet
Union declared war on Japan. Only a few months earlier these
two nations were joined together in a non-aggression treaty
but on 9 August 1945 the Soviet Union invaded Japanese held
Manchuria.
Why is this campaign held up as a kind of "model" or
"prototype" for Soviet offensive operations? The answer lies
in the examination of three related areas. First, one must
understand the historical background surrounding this campaign.
Second, one must know how much significance is placed on this
campaign, both by the Soviet and the West. Third, one must
review the lessons that can be learned from this campaign.
The first two of these areas will be dealt with in this sec-
tion while the third will be discussed during the review of
the case studies in Part III.
1 . Historical Views
There is an old saying that "history belongs to the
victor". In the case of Manchuria this fact is definitely
true. If one looks through histories of the Western world
they will find little mention of this campaign. If it is
mentioned it is dismissed as a Soviet last-minute attempt to
obtain any and all the land it could before the final defeat
of Japan. Most Western historians play down the importance
of this Soviet entry into war with the Japanese because it
came after the dropping of the first atomic bomb and occurred
almost simultaneously with the dropping of the second. Western
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historians tend to feel that the Japanese were already
defeated and the final outcome of the war was not altered
by this Soviet attack.
Soviet historians and military writers, as would be
expected, see things quite differently. The following is
taken from a Soviet journal which clearly expresses their
view of this campaign.
"No objective scholar can deny that it was the entry
of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan that led
to its swift and victorious consummation, altered the
very nature of the war in the Pacific and deprived U.S.
ruling circles of the chance to establish their domination
over the ruins of the Japanese "co-prosperity sphere".
But the professional apologists of U.S. imperialism, •
ignoring the fact, vainly try to rewrite history.
But the evidence of history, as the saying goes, is
the best witness.
Only the rout by the Soviet forces of the million-
strong Kwantung army, Japan's chief military force on
the Asian mainland, led to the swift end of the war in
the Far East and the unconditional surrender of
imperialist Japan." [Ref. 18]
In the opinion of this author neither the Western nor
the Soviet views are correct. The Western view does not give
credit to the Soviets for the several months it took to plan
and prepare for an attack of this size. Additionally, both
the U.S. and Britain asked for Soviet help and the attack was
conducted with the anticipation that the war might last
several months longer. Based on these two points it is felt
that the Western claim that the Soviet attack was a last-
minute operation is entirely false and without merit. The
Soviet view is also too one-sided, narrow and self-satisfied.
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The Soviets also give no credit to what the U.S. already had
accomplished in the Pacific in addition to the atomic bomb.
So what is the truth? This author believes one probably can
find it somewhere between these two views.
2 . The Importance of the Manchurian Campaign
The cultural tendency of the Soviet Union has made
its people more aware of its historical background than the
people of the U.S. The Soviet Union uses World War II (The
Great Patriotic War) as a kind of laboratory where lessons
can be learned and future applications can be derived. During
the period around the Sino-Soviet breakup (1960) a vast amount
of material on the Far East and the Manchurian campaign was
written. Western analysts who reviewed these articles saw
the Soviets using their experiences in the Far East during
Wrold War II, updating it and applying it to current situa-
tions. One such analyst was John Erickson who said: "The
Soviet Manchurian campaign in 1945 closely approaches in
style and scope what the Soviet command presently envisages
in the way of high speed ground operations . . . the Far East
campaign is a much more realistic model than the majority of
the operations in the European theater." [Ref. 19] To
encapsulate the Soviet view of this campaign written during
this period Marshal Malinovsky wrote: "The concluding
campaign of World War II, executed by the Soviet Armed Forces
in the Far East, was a new stride in the development of
Soviet military art. Many moments of preparation and conduct
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of this campaign are very typical for the beginning period
of a war, and therefore their experiences have current
significance." [Ref. 20]
The Manchurian campaign takes on added importance
because it is this campaign that the Soviets have selected
to write so much about. In the Soviets' opinion this
campaign is a letter-perfect example of where their theories
on military art and concepts in the use of surprise in warfare
were successfully translated into practice on the battlefield.
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III. THREE CASE STUDIES OF SOVIET SURPRISE
In previous sections this paper has examined what is
surprise and tried to establish a Soviet style of war-
fighting based on computer analysis. In the last chapter
the Manchurian model summarized what the Soviets hold as
an example of what all campaigns should be like if one
wants to achieve the maximum results from a surprise attack.
It was during this campaign that the Soviets believe they
received their graduation diploma from the, how to use
surprise, school of higher learning. Part III will look
at the offensive nature of Soviet military operations in
three Soviet campaigns; Manchuria, Czechoslovakia, and
Afghanistan. In an effort to see why there is such a strong
emphasis placed on the use of surprise in warfare by the
Soviets. Additionally, this part will also look at what
the Soviets did and what methods the Soviets employed in
order to achieve surprise.
A. MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN
1 . Background; Manchurian Campaign
During the 1930 's conflict and crisis were all
around and war was an ever present possibility. It was at
this time that both Germany and Japan were rearming them-
selves military and becoming increasingly bold and adventur-
ous. The question being asked was not if war was going to
happen, but where would it happen and when.
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with the Japanese in Manchuria to the east and
Nazi Germany to the west, the Soviet Union was caught between
two imperialistic nations who were seeking to satisfy their
ambition for power and more land. To make matters worse, it
was at this time that Stalin was attempting to consolidate
his own power in the Soviet Union and in so doing he was
eliminating competition by purging people he saw as a threat.
In carrying out this plan, Stalin greatly weakened the
political-military structure. A structure that would become
necessary in order to combat a crisis of significant magnitude
that was about to be thrust upon him. Seeing war on the hori-
zon Stalin sought to stabilize his position in the world. He
first sought the help of the British and French but as they
searched for security in Europe, they gave away one concession
after another to Hitler's Germany. Stalin knew that a part-
nership with the V7estern allies at this time was not in the
best interest of the Soviet Union. To avoid a two front
crisis, Stalin sought and obtained a non-aggression treaty
with Germany in August 1939. Although Stalin did not trust
Hitler, this gave the Soviet Union time to grow both economi-
cally and militarily. Stalin's plan called for the rest of
the world to go to war and the Soviet Union to sit back and
pick up the pieces as the other nations wore each other down.
Stalin did not have to wait long before he put this plan into
effect. Poland and Finland were his first targets.
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In the Far East the Japanese threat was constantly
on the minds of the leaders in Moscow. Soviet troops
increased from "100,000 in 1931 to about 600,000 in 1939."
[Ref. 21] During late 1938 and mid 1939 two major border
clashes took place along the Manchuria-Soviet border. Soviet
troops in this region fought valiantly and held their own
against the elite Japanese Kwantung Army. This excellent
showing by Soviet troops surely contributed to the Japanese
leaders' perception that a major war with the Soviet Union
at this time would not be wise. As an added assurance to
what the Far East army had already accomplished, Stalin, in
a period of less than two years, sought a second non-aggression
treaty with a potential adversary in order to prevent a war
and obtain security for the Soviet Union. A five year Soviet-
Japanese Non-Aggression treaty was signed in April 1941. For
Stalin and the Soviet Union security and peace was now theirs,
but it was to last just two short months before Hitler's
German army would invade
.
Between April 1941 and the early part of 1944 Soviet-
Japanese relationship was cordial and politically proper.
Each, country had other major and more immediate concerns
occupying their time. The Soviets were tied up with massive
battles against Germany and Japan had its hands full fighting
the U.S. in the Pacific.
As 1944 drew to an end the inevitable defeat of both
Germany and Japan became apparent. Soviet-Japanese relations
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started to decline and increasingly unfriendly overtures
were expressed in the Soviet press. Japan tried to entice
the Soviets into better relations by offering concessions in
Manchuria and the Far East.
A month after the Yalta conference, Japanese intelli-
gence received word of Stalin's promise of entering into war
against Japan. Japanese politicians believed that this promise
of a declaration of war was only a political gesture for the
benefit of Soviet's Western allies. However, the Japanese
military held this as a real threat but doubted the three
month time limit. It is during this same time frame that
Japanese intelligence first reported Soviet troop movement
to the Far East.
On April 5, 1945 the Soviet Union declared the
Neutrality Pact with Japan void. Japanese political leaders
still believed that war with the Soviet Union was a long
time off because, technically according to its terms, the
treaty was still in effect until one year after the announce-
ment of its termination. However, Japanese political leaders
attempted serious overtures toward the Soviet Union in an
effort to improve relations because of the following three
considerations: Japan did not want war with the Soviet
Union. Japan wanted to increase and cultivate Soviet friend-
ship. Japan desired to use the Soviet Union as a possible
mediator to end the war. [Ref. 22]
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The following is a summary of what the Japanese
believed was the Soviet's capability for war in the Far East
during the early part of 194 5:
1. The Soviet Union could enter the war as early as the
summer of 19 45, but more likely it would be in autumn.
2. The Soviets needed to transfer to the Far East 40
additional divisions before it would be ready to attack.
a. Because the Japanese first became aware of Soviet
troop movement in February it was felt that the
Soviet build up would not be completed until June
or July.
b. Assuming that the Soviets would need an additional
two months after the troops arrival to complete the
necessary offensive preparations, it was believed
that the earliest the Soviets would be ready would
be August or September.
2 . Intentions
In December of 1943 after Stalin returned from the
Teheran conference, he informed his military leaders that
within three to four months after Germany's defeat they would
participate in a war against Japan. In this same month the
first shipments of ammunition and supplies to be used in an
offensive operation against Kwantung Army were shipped to
the Far East.
At Yalta, Stalin pressured the West into accepting
his demands for the assurance of the Soviet Union's entry
into war with Japan.
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April 27th, three weeks after the denouncement of
the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, Soviet General Head-
quarters (GHQ) were told to proceed with plans for war with
Japan. Two months later the Far East campaign attack plan
was approved
.
At the Potsdam conference Stalin informed the allies
that the Japanese on two separate occasions have approached
the Soviet government about seeking peace with the allies.
On both occasions Stalin rejected the idea as being too vague.
On 7 August Soviet GHQ signed and sent the directive
to the Far Eastern Command, to commence military operations
against Japan on August 9th. [Ref. 23]
3 o Timing
From early July to early August the U.S. intercepted
several messages between Japanese Foreign Minister Togo and
Japanese Ambassador Sato in Moscow, discussing the possible
use of the Soviet Union as a mediator to end the war. The
Japanese, knowing that their eventual defeat was inevitable,
saw the only stumbling block that prevented the termination
of the war as the Allied position toward unconditional
surrender
.
On 26 July the Potsdam Declaration, calling for
Japanese unconditional surrender was delivered by message
to Tokyo. Two days later Japan answered these demands by
saying they were "absurd and unworthy of consideration."
[Ref. 24]
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On August 6th, a company-sized border incident took
place. Japanese subordinate armies viewed this incident as
just another in a long series of minor incursions, signifying
little. However, several of Kwantung Army staff officers saw
this as a precursor to war and predicted hostilities were
close at hand. On this same day the first atomic bomb was
dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima.
As late as the evening of the 7th of August, Togo
sent a message to Sato asking to seek a clarification of the
Soviet attitude towards Japan and their willingness to act
as a mediator on Japan's behalf.
August 8th, with the Soviet invasion less than a day
away, but still unknown to Japan, the Kwantung Army's
Commander in Chief, General Yamada, ignored his staff's
warnings and went on a planned vacation, leaving his head-
quarters .
That same day, 1700 Moscow time, 2200 Manchurian time,
2300 Tokyo time, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov met with the
Japanese Ambassador and informed him that "the Soviet govern-
ment declares that from tomorrow, that is 9 August, the
Soviet Union will consider herself in a state of war against
Japan." [Ref. 25] Two hours and ten minutes later Soviet
Troops crossed the Manchurian border in force.
When the attack occurred on the 9th of August the
timing was perfect. As mentioned in the strategic surprise
section, several reasons made the time of attack so advanta-
geous to the Soviets, but as an operational surprise the major
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reason was the fact that the Japanese felt the Soviets would
not attack before the end of the rainy season, which was still
a few weeks away.
4 , Place
In the Manchurian campaign the surprise attack came
in a well timed three front assault. The Transbaikal front,
in the west, the First Far Eastern front, in the east, and
the Second Far Eastern front in the north.
Secrecy was a key element. The Soviets' success in
achieving surprise in Manchuria was simply their ability at
all levels to keep secret the impending attack, the size of
the troops involved, and the direction from which a possible
attack would come.
To enhance secrecy no one but a few high ranking
Soviet officers knew the exact date and time the operation
was to start. Most important orders were issued and trans-
mitted in person by word of mouth. Additionally, senior
commanders who were brought in from the German front were
given fictitious names and ranks to protect their identity.
So detailed were the plans that the following tale shows to
what extent the Soviet went to ensure secrecy:
"At one staff meeting Marshal Meretskov, posing as
Colonel-General Maximov, was asked by another officer
if he had heard that Marshal Meretskov had arrived in
the Far East. Playing his role to the hilt, Meretskov
not only said he had not heard the rumor, but replied
he had never seen the Marshal." [Ref. 26]
Together with secrecy the concealment and camouflag-
ing of the vast amounts of troops and equipment was a major
contributing factor to the accomplishment of surprise.
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To increase the odds of success the Soviets planned
and positioned troops whose previous war time experience
against Germany in the West were now being pitted against
similar conditions against Japanese in the Far East. As an
example, those troops that saw action in mountain terrain in
Europe were now employed on the Transbaikal front were the
attack plan called for these troops to cross the Great
Khinghan mountain range. In addition to the special troop
placement, the Soviet used the natural terrain and landscape
of Manchuria as an aid to achieve surprise. The Soviet's
ability to get tanks and tracked vehicles over and through
the mountain passes was but one example of the Soviets attack-
ing from places that the Japanese believed were either
impassable or impossible to attack from.
To minimize the Japanese from gathering meaningful
intelligence information on this pending Soviet attack many
precautions were taken. Even though there were several
border incidents the Soviets made a concerted effort to try
to maintain the appearance of normalcy along the border area.
To ensure that troops did not give away their positions all
troop radio sets were placed on receive mode only. Soviet
intelligence collection operations were carried out to the
maximum extent possible but were limited so as to not to




The Soviet forces in the Far East were under the
command of Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky. These forces were
positioned on three fronts. The western^ Transbaikal Front,
under the command of Marshal Malinovsky consisted of the 17th,
36th and 39th Soviet Armies and the 6th Guard's Tank Army.
These units made-up 42% of the Soviet troops and equipment
used during this campaign. (see Table 41 for summary of
Soviet and Japanese strengths) In the east, the Soviets'
1st Far Eastern Front under the command of Marshal Meretskov
consisted of the 1st, 5th and 35th Soviet Armies. These units
made up one- third of the Soviet Far East forces. In the
north, the 2nd Far Eastern Front was led by General Purkayer
who commanded the 2nd and 15th Soviet Armies consisting of
one-fourth of the Soviet assets.
The Japanese forces were under the command of General
Ushiroku. These forces consisted of the Japanese's 44th Army
in the west, the 37th Army in the east, and the 4th Arm.y in
the north. Additionally, the Japanese had local forces from
Manchoukus , Inner Mongolia and the province of Suiyuan fighting
on their side. These additional forces increased Japanese
troop count but did very little to increase Japanese's
strength. [Ref . 28]
6. Style
The Soviet military showed themselves to be very
innovative during the Manchurian campaign. They used the
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TABLE 41
SOVIET AND JAPANESE STRENGTHS. AUG 19 4 5
JAPANESE RATIO NOTE
1,200,000 1.3 to 1 1,2,3,4
5,400 4.8 to 1
1,200 4.6 to 1




2. GUNS & 26,000
MORTARS








1. Sources have disagreed on the value of Soviet strength,
their numbers range from 1,059,000 to 1,577,725. The
numbers listed above represent the most widely agreed
upon figures. [Ref. 29]
2. Numbers include combat and support troops.
3. Japanese numbers include Manchurian troops.
4. Troops ratios went as high as 2 to 1 but, the key
was that the Soviets were able to achieve 8 to 1 ratios
by concentration at the point of attack.
5. Many Japanese aircraft (85%), were not battleworthy
.
6. Little or no Japanese naval resistance.
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concept of employing tanks in the first echelon as a
spearhead attack. This tactic reverses the normal textbook
approach to this battle front. By using this method the
Soviets were able to oveirwhelm the Japanese troops who have
never experienced this type of warfare before. The second
bonus received from this tactic was that the Soviets were
able to maintain great speed and depth into Japanese defenses
.
In fact the Soviet 6th Tank Guard army was able to average
60km per day and on some days as high as 90km. This feat
takes on added dimension because this operation had to be done
by crossing a formidable obstacle in the shape of the Great
Khinghan mountains. Once again Soviet skill and persistence
overcame a major difficulty, and the tactical gains achieved
by this accomplishment were significant. The Japanese placed
little emphasis in this area because they felt it was a
mountain range impassable to heavy equipment, so they had
relatively few men to defend against attack and hence were
totally surprised and quickly defeated by the Soviets.
Another area where the Soviets were innovative was
their first time use of the border guards to conduct the
initial phase of the war. These guards, because of their
knowledge of the countryside, were able to lead and direct
attacking combat troops with extreme accuracy. Because of
the speed in which the Soviet troops advanced these guards
took on the added responsibility of mopping up operations
behind the rapidly advancing lines of attack. This effort
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by the guards left the combat troops free to concentrate
on and continuing to forge ahead. [Ref. 30]
As was mentioned in other sections the factor of time
is extremely important to the achievement of surprise. Its
use in tactical engagement is at least as critical and may
be more important than for strategic surprise.
The last major concept the Soviets used to achieve
surprise and success, was their deception to spread out
their troops over the 5000km of the Manchuria-Soviet border.
By doing this the Japanese had to spread out its defenses to
meet the challenge. Because of tactical surprise the Soviets
were able to concentrate their forces at the point of attack
and along an axis of their choosing, thereby increasing sig-
nificantly their strength ratios. By the use of surprise and
deception the Soviets were able to achieve a surprise attack
and reaped many benefits from the effects it caused. In fact
they attacked simultaneously on all three fronts within an
hour of each other, causing great confusion at Japanese HQs
.
Once the attack occurred the speed of the Soviet
advance was so great that the Japanese were unable to mount
an effective counterof fensive . There were times that Japanese
HQ was unable to adequately give orders to control its own
troops. This became quite evident at the end of the war when
Japan had officially surrendered but the Kwantung troops did





. Summary; Manchurian Campaign
Surprise on a grand scale, is difficult to accom-
plish. But if one can play upon the already preconceived
ideas of a potential enemy, as the Soviets were able to do
with the Japanese, surprise can be successfully achieved.
The major weakness that allowed Japan to be surprised
on the Strategic level was not her inadequate warning but
the persistence of Japanese leaders in clinging to the belief
that the Soviets might help them end the war in a honorable
manner. It was this belief and desire that Richard Heuer
would say caused Japan to be a victim of her own preconcep-
tions. In his article, "Cognitive Factors in Deception and
Counterdeception" he said:
"... patterns of expectation become so deeply
embedded that they continue to influence perceptions
even when we are alerted to and try to take account of
the existence of data that do not fit our preconception."
[Ref. 31]
Additionally, the data from Whaley's study shows that
when preconceptions were exploited surprise was achieved 96%
of the time (see Table 1)
.
The Potsdam Declaration, USAF bombing Japanese cities,
the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the persistent
hanging on to the cultural bias of ending the war with honor,
the ever increasing threat of a U.S. invasion of the Japanese
home islands, these dilemmas and more are what the Japanese
had to deal with during the end of July and early August.
The Japanese had fought a hard war for four years, her
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military was exhausted, coimnunication and logistic chaotic,
supplies low and her people close to starving. The Soviet
picture was not much better for she too had gone through
much suffering and devastation. The major difference that
had to be a factor, was that the Soviets drew strength from
their victories where the Japanese at war's end knew nothing
but defeats. As can be seen, the Japanese were overwhelmed
with too much, too fast to be sensitive to the indicators of
a Soviet surprise attack. This is a problem that will be
seen again.
B. CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CAMPAIGN
1. Background; Czechoslovakian Campaign
After World War II Czechoslovakia became a political
battleground between the camps of democracy and communism.
The Communists in 19 46 in a public election were able to
succeed to power and become the largest party in Czechoslovakia
However, at this time they still did not have enough for a
ruling majority. In 1948 a Communist coup overthrew President
Benes, and quickly aligned itself with the Soviet Union and
Moscow's policies.
Czechoslovakia was both an origianl member of the
United Nations (1945) and the Warsaw Pact (1955) . In 1957
President Antonin Zapotocky was succeeded by Antonin Novotny.
In the next several years Czechoslovakia under Novotny 's
rule would slowly fall into disfavor with Soviet leadership.
In December 196 7 the Soviet Union General Secretary,
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Leonid Brezhnev, flew to Prague to meet with Novotny . It
was during this visit that it must have been decided that
Novotny could not longer function as the Soviets ' man in
Czechoslovakia. In January 1968 Novotny was replaced by
Alexander Dubcek. By Soviet standards Dubcek was very young.
He was only forty-six, but he had been a Communist all of
his life. He was well received by both his fellow country-
men and party members. Additionally, his entire political
background showed loyalty and support for the Soviet Union.
It was therefore not surprising that he met and fulfilled
the Soviet need for a new leader who could both satisfy the
Czechoslovakian people's quest for national identification
and yet keep the country firmly within the Soviets' sphere
of influence. This hope was short-lived, for revisionists
had already infected the country to such an extensive degree
that even Dubcek got caught up in its fever. Even though
Dubcek continuously assured Moscow of his allegiance and
promised that he would not let things get out of control,
by February there were indications that the Soviet Union
might move against Czechoslovakia with its military. All
during the month of April the major issue expressed toward
the Czechs in Soviet writings and official statements showed
an increased concern that the Czechs were being corrupted by
the West by allowing too many ties to be formed with
capitalist countries. Additionally, the Soviets feared
that the Czechs were upsetting the balance between the two
ideological philosophies. [Ref. 32]
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On 9 May Warsaw Pact military exercises began in
southern Poland. In June these exercises ended, only to be
quickly replaced with a group of new exercises involving
Poland, GDR, and this time included Czechoslovakia. It was
during Czechoslovakia's participation that 16,000 Soviet
troops entered into Czechoslovakia and were able to famil-
iarize themselves with local conditions and had what would
turn out to be a dress rehearsal for invasion. Once again
these exercises were terminated (11 July) but Soviet troops
did not stand down and manuevers continued. During this
period there appeared to be some ray of hope that a peaceful
solution to the difficulty could be agreed upon. A third
major exercise was announced and began on July 25. On the
2 7th the famous "Two Thousand Words" Manifesto was released
and printed in the Prague newspapers. This act of boldness
was likened to a fan being applied to the burning embers of
the revisionist's fire. A situation that needed a solution
before it got out of control. It became evident to Soviet
leaders that more and drastic action would be needed. There-
fore in conjunction with the scheduled exercise the Soviets
continued to increase the deployment of Soviet troops close
to the Czech borders. These "maneuvers" fooled no one of
their true intentions but they did serve as a transparanet
cover for keeping Soviet troops in place. To avoid the
outbreak of hostility the leaders of both countries agreed
to meet and discuss their differences. Two meetings took
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place, the first at Cierna from 29 July to 1 August and the
second at Bratislava on 4 August. Out of these negotiations
came promises and declarations to restore communist ideals
to Czechoslovakia in a peaceful but direct manner. Although
tension remained high, for the moment a crisis seemed avoided.
After the Bratislava meeting Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny,
high Soviet leaders, were reported to have gone off on
vacations giving support to the hope of the relaxing of
tension. However, nothing could be further from the truth,
for "Soviet troops earmarked for the invasion were ordered
on general alert on 11 August and remained in that posture
until the final go-ahead on the 20." [Ref. 33]
2 . Intentions
"All Soviet decisionmakers would have agreed that
Czechoslovakia should not be allowed to become a "second
Yugoslavai" or a "second Rumania" Brezhnev told the former
Czechoslovakian Ambassador Pavlovsky at an earlier stage
of the crisis that Czechoslovakia was not Rumania, or
Yugoslavia and that they would not let Czechoslovakia go."
[Ref. 34]
A factor that had to be considered by the Soviets
as they viewed the Czech situation was the deterioration
of their own world prestige. After the Bratislava agreement
there were indications that this agreement was perceived not
only by the Czechs but by other Communist countries "as a
sign of Soviet weakness and as a victory for the Czechs
over the Soviets." [Ref. 35]
124
In June 1968 the Soviet leaders most likely viewed
the possibility of intervention as one of its options, but
were trying to use it only as a last resort. However, as
time passed circumstances were quickly dictating the only
choice left open to the Kremlin. The Soviets m.ay have seen
the threat as a realignment of Eastern Europe with a possible
Czech - West German partnership or as an eroding of the
ideological doctrine of Communism among socialist states.
In any case the Soviet Union could not allow an independent
course of action from one of its "allies". The Soviet Union
regards Eastern Europe as vital to its national security and
it was prepared to use force if necessary to preserve the
hegemony there.
As late as the 17th of August the Soviet Politburo
sent a warning letter to the Czechoslovakian government
outlining Soviet concerns. This letter complained about
the non-compliance by the Czech to the arrangements agreed
upon at Cierna and Bratislava. It went on to say that the
Czechoslovakian government was misinterpreting and abusing
the freedoms allowed by these talks under the auspice of
Czechoslovakian nationalism. The letter implied that in the
Soviets ' eyes things were getting out of hand and something
needed to be done and done quickly before it became irre-
versible. The Soviets suggested it would be better if the
Czech government were the one to accomplish this. However,
if the unusable government of Dubceck could not be responsive
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to Soviet wishes, then it was Soviet responsibility to see




A factor that must be looked at when considering the
timing of the Soviet invasion is the changing and scheduling
of Czechoslovakian governmental meetings. The date of the
Congress of the Slovak Party was shifted from October to
August 26 . Soviet leadership saw this revision of date as
an attempt by the Czech reformers to legally size control of
Czechoslovakia. Additionally, the announcement that Secretary
General of the United Nations U Thant would visit Prague on
August 23 must have forced the Soviet leaders to carefully
consider the timing of their intervention. As Pravda put it,
"An atmosphere that was quite unacceptable for the socialist
countries had been created. Under such circumstances it was
necessary to act, and to act purposefully and decisively
without losing time." [Ref. 36]
As viable options began to be eliminated and invasion
loomed as the necessary course of action, the Soviet Union had
to assess what risks would be involved. It now appears that
militarily they felt the risk was low based on the fact that
Dubcek was unwilling to put up a fight and the "United States
—
caught up in the Vietnam war, racial disturbances, and
presidential politics -- was . . . unwilling to do anything
on behalf of Czechoslovakia. This position was implied in
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the public statements of Secretary of State Dean Rusk in
1968 and by President Johnson's strong interest in the
early start of SALT negotiations." [Ref. 37] The Soviet
invasion actually came on the eve of the planned announce-
ment of the forthcoming US-USSR Summit meeting between
President Johnson and the Soviet leader Kosygin in Leningrad
and the start of SALT negotiations.
Even though the Soviets tried to hide their troop
build-up among the cover of "maneuvers" it was accurately
detected by Western intelligence services. By early August
the West had a good idea of the routes a possible Soviet
invasion would take. There were some intelligence officials
who correctly estimated that an invasion would occur but they
erred on the exact date. Most Western analyst guessed that
the invasion would happen early in September. Therefore,
NATO commands did not respond to these signals nor did they
go on any type of increased alert status.
As their Soviet counterparts did after the agreements
of Bratislava, many of the Western leaders went on summer
vacations with the strong belief that the Czech crisis was
under control. On the 17th of August KGB agents were sent
to Prague to help arrange a coup to overthrow Dubcek . On
18-19 August Brezhnev notified Poland, East Germany, Hungary,
and Bulgaria of Soviet intentions to invade Czechoslovakia.
At 2230 on August 20th Soviet airborne troops took
control of the Prague airport. A half hour later Soviet and
Warsaw Pact ground troops crossed the Czechoslovakian border.
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On the morning of the 21st of August at 0115 the
Soviets conducted large scale jamming of Czechoslovakia,
which initially was interpreted by the West as just part of
the scheduled Soviet exercise. Not until 0150 over Radio




The main Soviet attack force consisted of 500 tanks
that traveled from the East German border to Prague, a
distance of sixty miles, in just over three hours. The other
two axises of attack crossed into Czechoslovakia directly
from Hungary and the Soviet Union.
The takeover of Czech airfield was considered by the
Soviets as vital to their success. It was during operations
to achieve this objective that tactical deception and surprise
was achieved. "The key airfield was the Ruzyne international
airport at Prague. At 2230 on the 20th (of August) an unsched-
uled Russian Aeroflot passenger plane requested landing
clearance, which the Prague control tower promptly granted.
An all-male "tourist" party disembarked, visited the lava-
tory, and emerged as uniformed troops to seize the airport
tower." [Ref. 38]
5 Strength
For Soviet initial invasion force summary see Table
42. The Czechoslovakian Army had 14 divisions consisting of
approximately 75,000 troops. These troops were positioned
facing westerly so as to protect the Warsaw Pact from any
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TABLE 4 2
SOVIET INITIAL INVASION FORCE (CZECHOSLOVAKIA)
[Ref. 39]








(1) Additional troops about equal in number remained
stationed at the border ready to respond if any serious
military resistance was to occur.
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possible NATO attack across Czechoslovakia's western border.
When the Soviet invasion came the Czech troops were "in
position" but in the wrong location to be of any assistance
to the Czech government even if it wanted to use its army.
6 = Style
The Soviet military tried to minimize hostile resis-
tance through well-coordinated efforts both inside and from
outside their target country. Sabotage, deception, ruse,
political coups are but a few examples of ways the Soviets
tried to weaken and deceive an opponent in order to enhance
their own chances of a quick and successful operation. The
following section is a summary of Soviet attempts to conduct
these types of activities prior to and during the Czech
invasion. "Three days before the actual invasion, the Soviet
army and KGB operatives apparently received an order to pre-
pare final details of the action. On that day an airplane
carrying special KGB units and the Czechoslovakia STB colla-
borators reportedly landed at the Prague airport to prepare
for the invasion." [Ref. 40]
"Although military resistance was not expected, the
Soviet General Staff was apparently ordered to take neces-
sary precautions to avoid conflict with Czechoslovakia Army
units. Reportedly, during the summer the Warsaw Pact
Command had lowered the Czechoslovakia fuel and ammunition
stocks by transferring those supplies to East Germany for
more "exercise". On August 19, the Warsaw Pact Command
succeeded in securing the consent of the Czechoslovakia
Ministry of Defense for an unexpected military exercise of
of the Czechoslovakia Army with the participation of Warsaw
Pact observers. The exercises were to take place on
August 21 - the second day of intervention. In reality,
this was probably a maneuver to concentrate the Czechoslovak
military forces in the western part of Czechoslovakia in
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order to minimize their opportunity to make contact with
the invading troops, as well as to divert the attention
of the Czechoslovak General Staff from the intervention."
[Ref. 41]
On 20 August, the Czechoslovak Presidium met to
discuss two major items. The first was the progress of the
upcoming Party Congress and the second was a discussion on
what direction the Czechoslovakia Community Party should
take in the future. Due to a misinterpretation of the exact
time of the Soviet invasion and the unsuccessful attempt of
the antireformists to reverse the planned agenda items at
this meeting, the Soviet invasion began without a formal
request for assistance. The hope of the antireformists was
to bring up the issue of the future of the Communist Party
in Czechoslovakia first so as to rally the Presidium behind
their cause and hopefully to successfully take over the
government by a peaceful coup. If they were successful in
this attempt they would then request the Presidium to pass
a resolution asking for Soviet assistance. All this was
anticipated to happen prior to Warsaw Pact troops crossing
the Czech border. Dubcek did not stand for a proposed change
to the agenda and therefore the antireformists did not execute
their coup and Soviet troops entered into Czechoslovakia
without being formally asked.
7
. Summary; Czechoslovakian Campaign
The Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia was
shaped by many factors. Surely national security was a
consideration, as must have been this attempt for nationalism
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by a Eastern European country that was inside the Soviet
sphere of influence. During the period leading up to the
invasion the messages received from the United States
professed their noninvolvement must have had an influence
to choose invasion. It also appeared that because of the
many constraints placed on the members of the Politburo that
these men had to compromise on the available options in order
to act decisively and quickly.
National preoccupations and preconceptions pre-
disposed Western governments to avoid a close look at the
Czech crisis and the impending threat as it developed. The
US was particularly guilty. VJarning signals were glossed
over by high officials as they seemed to be near-sighted
and only concerned with two issues: the increased escalation
of the Vietnam war and the hope of a successful US-Soviet arms
control negotiation. Although, once the Soviets had decided
to invade, if the United States wanted to act there would
have been little real responses that they could have taken
that would have changed the situation. However, by their
lack of timely action of any kind the U.S. did very little
to deter Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led troops
was entirely successful in terms of its immediate goals. It
achieved both tactical and strategic surprise. Its speed of
advance was so quick that it avoided both Czech military
resistance and foreign intervention of any sort. "By 0200
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on D-day itself, that is within two and half hour after the
invasion, Radio Prague simultaneously announced the border
crossings and forbade military resistance." [Ref. 42]
The Brezhnev Doctrine, which is used as a justifica-
tion for Soviet intervention into socialist wavering countries
is more than an expression of Soviet power, for with it comes
the burden to monitor the numerous Communist countries and
be ever ready to take military action if necessary. "An
American President justified the US involvement in Southeast
Asia by invoking the 'domino theory', and we all know how
costly the implications of that theory have been for his
country. But, for the Kremlin, the East European vassals
really are "dominoes": if one totters, they all may collapse."
[Ref. 43] The Czech campaign clearly demonstrates to what
extent the Soviet leadership is willing to go to hold on to
and defend Communism and Soviet gains. It will use force if
necessary as a pretext to ensure security of its own borders.
C. AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN
1 . Background; Afghanistan Campaign
It was in the late 1940 's that Great Britain withdrew
its claims in this part of the world and by so doing created
a power vacuum waiting to be filled.
In 1952 Afghanistan actively sought and asked for
US military aid. Washington avoided the issue by insisting
that Afghanistan first join a regional security pact with her
neighbors. VJhen Afghanistan pressed the US for a commitment
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on behalf of Afghanistan's defense the US response was less
than favorable toward the Afgan government, for in the US
view Afghanistan was too far removed and the US lacked the
necessary presence to ensure her adequate protection - a
problem that hinders more aggressive and positive action
by the US. It was true then and remains true today.
Late in 19 53 Mohammed Daud ascent to power and pro-
mises to "bring Afghanistan into the 20th centry". [Ref. 44]
The Soviet Union stepping in to fill the void left the US
and under the guise of its newly announced foreign policy to
help the Third World nations of Africa and Asia, generously
gave economic aid to Afghanistan.
In 1954 the US by giving aid to Pakistan alienated
Afghanistan and anti-American riots break out in the capital
city of Kabul. For the next several years Daud continued to
play up to both sides and was successful in getting aid from
both the US and USSR. In fact in 1959 President Eisenhower
stopped for a brief visit to Kabul, followed shortly by a
similar visit in 1960 by General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev.
Late in 1960 through early 1961 sporadic border war
between Afghanistan and Pakistan erupted over an old disputed
claim of the ownership of Pashtunistan, which was originally
incorporated into Pakistan when the British left India many
years prior but was never recognized by Afghanistan. The
Western world backed Pakistan in its claim and the Soviet
Union backed Afghanistan. Due to this issue diplomatic rela-
tions with Afghanistan and the West were officially severed.
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In 19 6 3 amidst economic troubles the Afghan King
asked Daud to step down, and he was replaced by Muhammed
Youseph. The next year a parliamentary monarchy was estab-
lished. This change and the easing of domestic rule allowed
liberal factions to begin to form. In January 1965 the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was organized
with Muhammed Teraki as its leader.
From 1967 to 1970 because of the heavy involvement
in Vietnam by the US and the commitment by the USSR to support
North Vietnam, aid to Afghanistan from these two superpowers
was drastically reduced.
Because of diverse points of views in 1967 the PDPA
divided into two factional parties, the Khalq and the Parcham.
The Khalq, (which means the People's Party) were made up of
largely Pashtuns and comprised half of the population in
Afghanistan, their leader was Teraki. The Parcham, (which
means the Red Banner) were a mix of urban tribes and Kabul's
intellectuals, their leader was Babrak Karmal. [Ref. 45]
Political stability in Afghanistan showed clear signs
of giving way in 1973, when the Afghanistan military assisted
Prince Mohammed Daud in the ouster of his cousin King Zahir
Shah in a bloodless coup. From 1973 to 1976 Daud established
stronger ties with regional nations and the Western World.
Due to the growing concern over the policies of Daud in 1977
the Khalq and the Parcham forces reunited and formed a new
PDPA.
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Sensing the opportunity to exploit a revolutionary
situation, the Soviets, who were suspicious of Daud's dealings
with Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, began to assist Teraki's
regime in what became the transformation of a neutral buffer
state into a Soviet satellite. Although they promoted revolu-
tionary change, the Soviets nevertheless urged Teraki to work
toward reconciliation with the Muslim tribes that had begun
to resist his Kabul regime. [Ref. 46]
On April 17, 1978 a Parcham party leader was assassi-
nated. At his funeral two days later thousands of demonstra-
tors broke into widespread rioting and it was necessary to
call up the army to aid the police in controlling the crowds.
One decision that eventually led to Daud's downfall was his
middle-of-the-road policy of neither negotiating nor trying
to defeat the rioting rebels. For, on April 28th he was
killed in a political coup and the PADA took over the govern-
ment of Afghanistan. Teraki became prime minister, Hafizullan
Amin became deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and
Karmal became another deputy prime minister.
By June an estimated seven hundred Soviet military
advisors were working with the Afghanistan army. This was a
marked increase from previous operations. A further shift
toward Soviet influence occurred in December when a twenty-
year treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between
the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. It was this treaty after
the invasion that was used in part to justified Soviet actions,
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for the treaty states: "to take appropriate measures to
ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity
of the two countries". [Ref. 47] Moscow repeatedly stated
that it was only and legally fulfilling its treaty commitments
In late 1978 and into early 1979 widespread revolts
started to spring up throughout the countryside. The Afghan
people were unhappy with the radical social and land reform
measures they were forced to endure, but more importantly
they were angry at the Khalq's anti-Islamic rhetoric.
By March the rebellion spread to such a degree that
Afghanistan armed forces were being defeated by the rebels
in several of the provinces. During this time the Soviets
increased both their weapons and equipment shipments and
also increased the numbers of "advisors" to Afghanistan.
The Soviet military advisors during this period, because of
the poor performance by the Afghan army, assumed direct
combat and leadership roles in the Afghan army.
Due to the deteriorating situation, Teraki abdicated
his position as prim.e minister on 27 March. He remained as
secretary of state and defense minister. The prime minister
went to Amin. It was believed that because of his close
ties with the Afghan military he would be able to put down
the revolt.
The alliance of convenience between the Khalq and
the Parcham factions soon wore out its usefulness and the
Khalqs, because of their stronger ties with the military, were
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able to consolidate their power. To reduce the challenge
from the Parchams most of their leaders were sent to
embassy post abroad. Soviet-favored Parcham leader Karmal
was sent to Czechoslovakia as an ambassador.
During the spring and summer high Soviet military
and diplomatic officials visited Afghanistan in an effort
to get a first hand look at the situation. Their purpose
was to ease the pressure of the crisis that was building and
to bring Amin's policies into closer alignment with those
deemed appropriate by Moscow. In both instances no progress
was made and in fact the crisis was getting out of control
and Amin was becoming bothersome and threatening to the Soviet
way and style. The reports brought back by these officials
had to be very pessimistic and extremely worrisome to the
Politburo. I
In August two significant mutinies took place. The
first was inside Kabul's strategic Bula Hissar Fortress.'
It took Soviet tanks and heavy armament to put it down. The
second involved an Afghanistan armored brigade which killed
all of its Soviet advisors and then joined the side of the
rebels taking their Soviet made equipment with them. Deser-
tions and mutinies raked the Afghanistan army and now the
rebels in control of large sections of the countryside, the
main source of new recruits were virtually cut off. [Ref. 48]
The Soviets responded to the deteriorating situation
by sending still more military aid and advisors. Additionally,
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the Soviets took over the Bagram Air Base, located eleven
miles north of Kabul. This base was essentially Soviet
controlled and limited to Soviet personnel only. The Soviets
soon delivered to this base many Soviet aircraft and heli-
copters, their mission being fire support for Soviet ground
troops. It was during this period that Soviet units inside
Afghanistan began to operate and work independently of the
Afghan army, its commanders and its troops.
When Teraki visited Moscow in September, Pravda
reported on the 13th, that Teraki could be assured that he
could rely on the "all-around" assistance of the Soviet Union,
which included military support. Upon Teraki 's return to
Kabul, and with Soviet support, an anti-Amin coup was planned.
Their objective was to establish a Khalq-Parcham coalition
government led by Teraki and Karmal. The coup was a failure
and instead of Amiin, Teraki was removed from power and sub-
sequently murdered by Amin's officers. [Ref . 49]
The Soviets probably started planning for a possible
invasion many months prior to its actual execution. Looking
at Soviet activity it appears that a practice airlift similar
to the one that would be used against Kabul airport was held
in August. Both Soviet troops and their equipment were flown
from the Soviet Union to South Yemen and Ethiopia and back
again.
In late November US intelligence detected the mobili-
zation of Soviet troops in Turkmenistan and in other areas
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along the Afghanistan borders. Local reserves were being
called up. "By early December 1979, an estimated 3,500 to
4,000 Soviet military personnel were positioned in the Afghan
army at every level of command." [Ref. 50] Western analysts
noticed a military build-up on the Afghanistan border when
some Soviet forces and tactical aircraft were shifted from
the Iranian frontier. On 8-9 December airborne units of over
1,000 men, equipped with tanks and artillery, were airlifted
to the Bagram airfield, where they were able to reinforce the
Soviet units deployed there in September. This was the
largest troop input into Afghanistan since September. Ten
days later a large portion of this force was in place at the
Salang Pass along the Kabul-Qondoz highway. This unit would
hold that strategic point until 28 December when it would be
linked with the lead elements of the invading Soviet forces.
2 , Intention
Even in a country as backward and fanatically Islamic
as Afghanistan, with hardly a semblance of a "working class"
(as Marx would define it) and with only a small number of well
educated elite, the Soviet Union was able to find enough
"Communists" to form a government - even though their size
and abilities turned out to be insufficient to hold control
unaided by Soviet military aid and troops. "One may doubt
the ideological commitment of these Afghan clients, but in
Moscow's eyes that has long ago ceased to be a virtue as
important as plain obedience." [Ref. 51]
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Afghanistan under Teraki's rule pursued a brutal
and savage struggle in an attempt to civilize and socialize
this backward and Muslim country. These tribal and proud
people were being forced to do things that they in their
wildest dreams never even thought about no less ever ex-
perienced and now a new life style was being forced on to
them by laws and regulations instituted by their government.
When Amin took over the leadership of Afghanistan
there was hope that he would restore order and justice fairly
to all of Afghanistan. This hope soon became an empty breeze
with no substance, for Amin in many ways was more cruel and
harsh than Teraki ever was and despite increasing Soviet
military assistance he was unable to suppress the growing
resistance of the Muslim rebels. Even with the aid of Soviet
advisors in key command and control positions and Soviet pilots
flying combat missions in jet fighters and helicopter gunships
the strength of the rebel army grew. At the end of 19 79 the
rebels were successful in holding off Amin's offensive and
controlled most of rural Afghanistan. The Afghan army was
slowly deteriorating, due to mutinies, desertions, and poor
leadership. Soviet advisors began to receive heavy casual-
ties. In Soviet eyes, the situation was becoming desperate.
They view Amin as a traitor and a loser. The Soviets feared
that with increased pressure Amin might try to reestablish
his ties with the West or even China.
141
At the end of 1979, the situation became critical.
The Soviets had worked themselves into a corner with few
options left open. They could not allow a victory by Islamic
fanatics^ nor would they tolerate the counterrevolutionary
ideas supported by Amin's government.
The Soviet Union has become increasingly concerned
with the ethnic groups that reside inside of the USSR. The
Soviets dislike the trend in birth rate that shows Russian
ethnic population almost at zero and Muslim and Islamic
ethnic group rates increasingly significantly. The Soviets
are experiencing difficulty in controlling a nation where
there are so many varied and widely scattered ethnic groups.
This fact is documented in their history and there is a
genuine concern over the loyalty of their own people. For
example, in World War II when Germany invaded the Soviet
Union many Ukrainians came out and cheered and gave food and
flowers to the invading German armies. In more recent years
with the revolts and insurgencies of the fundamentalist in
Iran and the Muslim in Afghanistan right on Soviet borders
have done nothing to ease this fear and concern.
One does not know what ultimately caused the Soviets
to decide to invade Afghanistan. Was it for national security?
Was it to control a satellite nation? Or, was there some
strategic goal? A possible answer is the Brezhnev Doctrine,
which states that the USSR has the justification and the
right to intervene on the behalf of any communist country
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in order to preserve socialism. This doctrine is an ever
popular rationale for Soviet actions.
3 . Timing
When the Soviet leaders considered their options in
the Afghanistan crisis they had to look at the possible
American responses which might occur because of one of their
choices. However, during the Soviet leadership's debate over
what to do about Afghanistan, the US was preoccupied with its
own crisis in Iran. This US involvement made the Soviet option
to invade seem less risky than it otherwise might have been if
the US was free to respond with any significant action.
"The crucial turning-point during the Afghan crisis
was the seizure of the American hostages in early November.
US failure to respond promptly with firm measures, including
the use of military force, and the subsequent agonizing over
the crisis were likely additional factors in the Politburo
assessment of the cost and benefits of the invasion." [Ref.
52] To make the international picture even more difficult,
in early December the Soviets promised Iran support if the
US was to use force to rescue its hostages. By offering
their support to Khomeini, the Iranian government need not
be rushed or pressured to release their hostages. This stra-
tegy would keep the US distracted with Iran while freeing the
Soviets to respond in Afghanistan.
The invasion of Afghanistan was scheduled for 25-26
December, during the Christmas holiday when most American and
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Western leaders would either be on vacation or home for
the holidays.
Troops actually started across the border at 0715




The Soviet invasion was spearheaded by four motorized
rifle divisions which fanned out toward Herat, Kabul and the
Pakistan border. Two divisions reached Kabul by way of the
Termez and Kunduz roads, while the other two moved down the
Kushka-Herat road. The Soviet troops continued to advance
until they converged on Kandahar, in a classic pincer move-
ment. A tank division followed the advance on the Herat
road, acting as an operational reserve for the Soviet area
commander
.
On the night of 27 December elite Soviet airborne
troops along with special assault detachments moved into
Kabul from the airport, sabotaged the central telephone
exchange and seized the radio and television station as well
as the presidential palace and other major government buildings
5. Strength
The Soviet army had an estimated 80,000-100,000 combat
troops in position for the invasion of Afghanistan. By the
first day of the new year 50,000 Soviet troops had crossed
into Afghanistan. The Afghan army was for all practical
purposes at the time of the invasion under the control of
Soviet forces. The Afghan rebels who numbered about 30,000
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were neither organized nor prepared to stop a Soviet attack
even if they knew it was coming.
6. Style
Years of infiltration by friendly Afghan forces and
Soviet agents plus last-minute seizure and sabotage carried
out by KGB operatives and Soviet military advisers were able
to neutralize many command and control nodes prior to or in
the early stages of the invasion. One of these commando
teams peacefully relieved the Afghanistan personnel manning
the central communication system early on the morning of the
invasion.
Even though the Soviet High command did not expect
any effective fighting or resistance from the Afghanistan
rebels they were none the less concerned because, "all the
frictions of warfare are most strongly manifest when every
move must be made swiftly, when specific buildings and even
specific rooms must be found and seized in a surprise action
tightly coordinated in time and space. Small teams of sol-
diers had to find their way, and quickly, in a strange city
and at night. Only the most careful training and the most
precise control can prevent accidental encounters with
hostile elements, or even fractional fighting; only timing
exactly coordinated can preserve surprise as the assault
teams go for their separate targets all over the city."
[Ref. 53]
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Soviets were able to disarm two Afghan armored divi-
sions by convincing their leaders to turn in their ammunition
and antitank weapons for inventory. Tank batteries were
recalled for wintering, while tanks were scheduled for
maintenance and sent to the repair depots.
The night before the invasion Soviet officials hosted
a reception for Afghan dignitaries; when the party was over
all the invited guests were arrested. At the same time Soviet
military officers were giving a cocktail party for their
Afghan counterparts. Toward the later part of evening the
Soviet host, leaving plenty of liquor, slipped out of the
party. Only with the sound of gunfire did the Afghan
officers find out that they were locked in their own quarters
.
An estimated two hundred flights of Soviet aircraft
landed in Kabul on 24-26 December, deploying 10,000 Soviet
airborne troops.
Prior to the invasion, Soviet officials tried to
exploit factional struggle and prepare the way for a new
pro-Soviet government. The Soviet aim was to institute a
government which would ask for Soviet assistance, and thereby
legitimize the Soviet invasion.
On 27 December a special Soviet assault unit and
some Afghans attacked Amin and his supporters who refused
to surrender. Amin died after a few hours of fierce battle.
Later that day, Karmal declared himself the new leader of
Afghanistan and stated that he had asked for Soviet assistance
to stabilize his new government.
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7 . Summary; Afghanistan Campaign
Soviet- funded intrastructure greatly facilitated the
1979 invasion. As the Britain's prime minister, Mrs. Thatcher,
put it, "Soviet tanks crossed Afghanistan on roads built with
Soviet money, and their aircraft landed on airfields similarly
financed." [Ref. 54]
The direct use of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and
its use to overthrow an established government and the sub-
sequent military occupation were without precedent outside
Eastern Europe. Additionally, it appears that Soviet troops
were directly involved with the elimination of Amin and his
government.
In the Afghanistan campaign the Soviets were willing
to abandon their traditionally low profile of limited, tem-
porary and defensive combat involvement. For the first time
the Soviet Union has taken on an open-ended commitment to
pacify a Third World state using Soviet troops.
Due to Amin's defiant result to incorporate Soviet
directions and ideas, the alienation of Afghan society by
Amin's cruel regime, and the deterioration of the Afghanistan
army made the choice of invasion almost inevitable. "Had it
not invaded Afghanistan at the end of 1979, Moscow had every
reason to expect the catastrophic collapse of the Marxist
revolution in a country bordering on the USSR - a country in
which Moscow had already invested enormous political and
military capital - and the consequent loss of its own
prestige." [Ref. 55]
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The success of the Afghanistan invasion and coup
may be a sign to Soviet leaders that in the future they
will not stand by waiting for a coup to happen but rather
they may be tempted to simulate one on their own. "Soviet
military invasions are responses to what the Soviets believe
are dangerous developments and/or attractive opportunities
in countries located in geographic promixity to the USSR as
well as in strategic areas of the Third World." [Ref. 56]
If the past is a looking glass of what might be done
in the future then a lesson that might be learned from
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union is that if one acts boldly
in carrying out his action, his actions may bring about great
rewards
.
US intelligence knew about and were monitoring Soviet
troop movement in and around Afghanistan. Several times prior
to the invasion President Carter officially notified the
Soviet Union of his concern over Soviet action around
Afghanistan. However, due to the heavy involvement in the
Iranian hostage crisis by the US, a credible American response
could not be done.
Afghanistan was a victim of its location; it shares
a common border with the Soviet Union. Additionally,
Afghanistan's inherent political and economic weakness made
it especially vulnerable to Soviet influence. The Soviet
Union believes it was justified for its own security to
obtain and become a dominant influence in Afghanistan.
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Now that the Soviet Union has "control" of
Afghanistan they can deploy their tactical aircraft in
Afghan Air Bases and in a crisis can more effectively
challenge the US naval task force present in the Persian
Gulf and Indian Ocean. Additionally, due to the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has improved its
position both politically and militarily in regard to the
possible adversaries, China and Pakistan.
Today the resistance still continues, and the
Soviets show no signs of leaving. It is sad and unusual
to see such injustice being carried out and yet there is
little being done. The United States appears to be
resigned to the fact that this is a Soviet internal problem
and therefore makes little effort to provide assistance
to the rebels. One would think that with all the Third
World countries, revolutionary groups, and Muslim believers
that there would have been a bigger and longer outcry of
pxiblic opinion against this war than there has been. It
appears that like the US the rest of the world has resigned
itself to the fact that Afghanistan is too far away to do
anything effective and therefore they let the Soviets
handle its own problems by themselves.
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Part IV is divided into three sections. The first chapter
summarizes the main points and conclusions that were reached
in the first three parts of this paper. Although the main
theme of this paper was to look at surprise and especially
the Soviet style of surprise, one would be remiss if in that
process, ways to prevent or minimize the effects of surprise
were not examined. Therefore, in chapter two this subject
is discussed. This paper ends by making several suggestions
and recommendations on how to institute the conclusions drawn
from chapter one and the ideas presented in chapter two.
A. CONCLUSION
Warsaw Pact military strategy as shown by its
literature and military exercises calls for large-scale
penetration into enemy territory in order to secure
strategic objectives; it continues to emphasize the
element of SURPRISE and the necessity of rapid
offensive operations.
(emphasis added) [Ref. 57]
The above quote was used by United States Secretary of
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger in his preface to the 1985
publication of Soviet Military Power . This official govern-
ment publication is an unclassified description of what is
seen as the present threat imposed by the Soviet Union and
its Warsaw Pact allies. As has been shown by Soviet litera-
ture, by historical examination and reemphasized by the
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statement above, surprise has been, is and will continue to
be a key element in their strategy. Soviet military doctrine
and philosophy emphasize the many advantages that surprise
attacks can bring. Therefore it would be self-deceiving to
not expect the Soviets to make every effort to achieve it in
future operations
.
For all the advantages surprise can give an attacking
force, surprise still remains an underrated factor, and is
often taken too lightly by political strategists in their
planning. However, in military operations in the last twenty
years the use of both surprise and deception techniques have
been increasing sharply. The Historical Evaluation and
Research Organization supports this observation, and states
"The effects of surprise appear to be greater in more recent
wars than they were in World War II". [Ref. 58] They go on
to explain that in the use of their Quantified Judgment Model
that the surprise effect computation of their formula should
be multiplied by a factor of 1.33 for all wars after 1966 to
account for this increased use and effect.
For the Soviets surprise is not an either/or situation
but a question of degrees. Nor does surprise need to be
perfect to succeed, that is, in order to benefit from the
advantages of its effects. The Soviets view surprise as a
combination of their victim's misperceptions
,
preconceptions




Several common themes on surprise which often appear in
Soviet military literature can be summarized by the following
four statements: (1) Surprise can be re-used and achieved at all
levels of warfare. (2) Deception is a positive measure to use
in order to enhance the success of surprise. (3) Surprise at
the strategic level can drastically reduce the time, cost, and
effort for the attainment of victory. (4) Surprise strategy
and tactics used in the Manchurian campaign is seen as a model
of how well the Soviet Union can use effective procedures in
modern combined arms operation and supply logistics to
support it.
Table 44 summarizes Soviets views of what surprise can
accomplish and the advantages that could be attended if
surprise was successful.
The Soviet Union is a society that believes that all
things can be examined scientifically. The believe that
there are "Laws of War", just as there are "Laws of Phyics",
and these laws govern the outcome of war. The Soviets believe
that all wars follow these laws and if one knew them they
could properly predict the outcome of any war before its
start. Fortunately, for the West, the Soviets admit that at
the present time they do not know all the laws. However, the
Soviets think that they can get a better insight in these laws
by studying historical battles. They believe the laws do not
change and use the history of World War II as a laboratory in
an attempt to capture these laws and reapply them under modern
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TABLE 44
SUMMARY OF SOVIET VIEWS ON SURPRISE








II. ADVANTAGES OF SURPRISE
1. Change the correlation of forces.
2. Lower one's enemy's combat capability.
3. Create panic and lost of enemy's morale.
4. Loss of control (enemy disorganized)
.




(b) with smaller forces.
(c) with lower losses.
III. FACTORS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SURPRISE
1. Secretly positioning of forces and equipment (Logistic)
2. Use of weather.
3. Secrecy of plans of operation.
4. Communication security.
5. Disinformation.
6. Camouflage and concealment.
7. Terrain (unexpected axis of attack)
.
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8. Audacity and Speed of advance (firepower)
.
9. Exploit moral implication to enemy (shock).
10. Maintenance of normalcy (i.e. along border)
.
11. Maximum use of accurate intelligence collection efforts.
12. Use of night operations.
13. Creative organization of forces (tactics).
14. Introduction of new technology and/or weapons.
15. High level of troop readiness (training, equipment, morale)
16. Axis of advance (direction), unknown or several.
17. Demonstrations (deceptive maneuver).
18. Use of imitation (decoys, dummies)
.
19. Ability to anticipate the enemy's behavior.
20. Officer corps leadership skills and abilities.
21. Use of preconceptions of the enemy.
22. The low response time of the enemy.
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conditions. As was shown in Part II, the Soviets remeinber
the lessons of history more than the United States. This
was pointed out by United States Secretary of State George
Schultz in a speech he gave in April 19 85, in which he was
comparing Vietnam and Nicaragua and he asked "How many times
must we learn the same lesson?" [Ref. 59]
The Soviets seem to learn their lessons well and are able
to apply complimentary principles to pose a great threat to
the West. In Table 18 it was shown that when the force ratio
of a country increases so does the probability of their
achieved success. Additionally, it was shown that when
surprise is interjected into their equation the surprise was
able to change the relationship and less forces were needed
in order to achieve comparable success. The three case studies
showed that the Soviets held an unquestionable superiority
in strength as compared to their adversary and yet they
employed detailed deceptive tactics in order to achieve
surprise. When one couples the results of Table 18 with the
implications of the case studies, one sees the Soviets not
satisfied with marginal benefits and exploiting the advan-
tages gained from both force superiority and surprise.
It can be shown from the data and cases that with a
relatively small number of deceptive ruses one stands a high
probability of a successful surprise attack even if they are
detected and a warning is sounded. When the data is examined
on the factor of warning a striking paradox is found. It was
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often the case that the leaders of a country prior to the
start of a war knew his aggressor's strategy and plans.
Additionally he had relatively reliable intelligence informa-
tion of the strength of the enemy troops and the probable
place and time of their attack. There was warning and there
was an opportunity to take measures to counter this surprise
attack. However, in most cases nothing was done until after
the attack had begun. The main reason to explain this non-
action when one is in the jaws of danger is misperception
and rationalization. These subjects will be covered in the
next chapter.
To summarize the Soviets' style of surprise one can look
at the five factors of surprise and see how the Soviets
typically try to achieve them:
Intentions Misinformation through the use of propaganda,
KGB, and the use of Western public opinions
and place movements. Additionally the use of
negotiations and treaties in order to hide their
intentions or to slow down the advantages of
the West and allow them to close the gap.
Time (1) The data suggests the Soviets preferred and
achieve their greatest success during the
morning period, however, nighttime is often used
(2) When it comes to days they prefer to attack
on Thursday and Sunday and tend to do it during
Holiday or rainy seasons.
Place (1) The use of camouflage and deception
techniques can cause doubt of main attack and
therefore must protect along a wider area.
(2) The Soviets have a propensity to do the
impossible when it comes to difficulty of
terrain. The Impossible becomes the fuel for
surprise.
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strength Strength is increased by concentrating
forces at the point of attack and using
Blitzkrieg type tactics. The Operational
Maneuvering Group (OMG) concept fits well
into this strategy.
Style (1) The research efforts by the Soviets are
impressive as they continue to develop new
weapons and new methods of using these and
other systems they already have. (2) "On
maneuvers" is a favorite ruse to achieve
mobilization.
Although these items listed above appear to be typical and
preferred by the Soviets, it should be noted that any habit
if it is known and used is not a surprise. These preferences
must always be scrutinized to avoid the trap of being surprised
by one's own preconceptions.
The incidents of the KAL 00 7, Major Nicholson, and the
Soviet grenade instructor suggest that the Soviets are not
like Americans and in fact are drastically different in their
way of thinking. Yet the West continues to be surprised by
Soviet behavior. When the West thinks the Soviets should do
one thing they surprise us and do something else. Early April
19 85, a large Soviet Naval task force was operating in the
Sea of Japan and was headed south. This event is significant
for two reasons: it was the first time the Soviets had assem-
bled a carrier group and because both the Japanese and American
analysts thought the task force would continue south and
exercise in the Indian Ocean. Both were proven wrong when
the group changed course to the east. The Soviets surprised
the West because they used new methods in the use of a system
they already possessed and in their behavior, but only because
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the Western analysts allowed their perceptions to cloud their
thinking. [Ref. 60]
To analysts the Soviet style is seen as being too rigid
and inflexible and they are or would be vulnerable to Western
forces because of their emphasis or innovation on the battle-
field. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Soviets
have shown with both the utilization of the OMG concept and
an overwhelming commitment to the use of surprise attacks that
they are also committed to flexibility.
V.Y. Savkin in his book The Basic Principles of Operational
Art said: "If one has succeeded in deceiving the enemy once,
then he will not allow himself to be deceived a second time by
the same technique. Therefore, there is a continuous search
for newer techniques and methods for achieving surprise"
.
[Ref. 61] It is paradoxical if one uses a technique one loses
its value as a subsequent element of surprise yet if training
and use does not occur one can not be sure how successful its
employment will be.
The Soviet Union is a secretive state and one can expect
to find continued efforts by the Soviets to develop new means
and ways to deceive and conceal its true intention, whereby
achieving new methods with which to surprise the West.
B. SURPRISE AVOIDANCE: THE PROBLEM
Surprise depends on a state of mind that must be artfully
created. Surprise can be aided by the use of deception but
to be successful these techniques must be rational and must
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prey upon an intended victim's perceptions. For surprise in
its simplest form is no more than the creation and support
of a false reality that one's enemy tend to believe is true.
Therefore, in order to avoid surprise one must discover where
these falsehoods exist.
Surprise attacks are successful because they take advan-
tage of behavioral factors. Some of these factors are:
perceptions, attitudes, assumptions, cultural values, norms
and bias, and the roles and the dynamics of group interaction.
For surprise to be successful a would-be surpriser must be
able to modify and control the above factors so that an
intended victim's perception and fear of vulnerability to
the pending attack is minimized. Roberta Wohlstetter in her
studies of the Japanese attack in Pearl Harbor discovered
that "the possibility of such surprise at any time lies in
the conditions of human perception and stems from uncertain-
ties so basic that they are not likely to be eliminated though
they might be reduced". [Ref. 62]
Surprise occurs not for the lack of good intelligence
information but due to the misperception of the available
information. Simply stated misperception is a discrepancy
between what one holds to be true and what is actually true
in the real world. World leaders try to structure new infor-
mation into already held theories and beliefs. Information
which supports these theories is noticed and processed, and
signals that do not fall to the side. When the amount of"
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information increases and especially when that information
is ambiguous a leader has little alternative than to fall
back on his own preconceptions and beliefs. As was discussed
in a paradox in the last chapter, information in most cases
was available to warrant an alert of possible attack but the
information did not agree with the strategically held assump-
tions and therefore was either ignored or misinterpreted.
When one is looking at surprise avoidance it is difficult
to say that the surpriser should be credited with achieving
surprise or the victim blamed for failing to avoid it. How-
ever, this type of argument is never-ending and similar to
asking if a cupy is half full or half empty. The answer still
leaves the basic problem for the potential victim: being
able to detect from all the signals what is noise and what is
warning, and being able to do it before the attack, not
afterward.
Since surprise is a behavioral factor, to understand it
and prevent it one must look at two areas. First, an under-
standing of the behavioral style of his enemy is essential.
The Soviet style of surprise has been discussed earlier. But in
the context of surprise avoidance, when there is any suspicion
that an adversary might attack, one must do two calculations:
First, figure out how, when and where this attack would occur
and determine what would be the outcome; secondly, recalculate,
changing the assumption that this adversary was able to achieve
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a surprise attack. If the outcome changes in favor of the
adversary when using surprise, then in all probability he
will employ that tactic and it would be wise to take active
measures beforehand to see that he is not successful. Addi-
tionally, when one is confronted with the possibility of a
surprise attack the answers to the following three questions
may provide the necessary inputs for a solution to help combat
and minimize the effects caused by this type of attack. What
goal does the enemy want to achieve? What risk is the enemy
willing to undertake? How many surprises alter the cost-
benefit ratio if one's enemy chooses to attack?
The second behavioral factor that needs to be understood
is the behavioral style of one's own government, military,
and self. The surest way to be a victim of surprise attack
is to fail to anticipate war. There are three major errors
that must be avoided. (1) The making of erroneous assessments,
assumptions or expectations. (2) The failure of one's warning
network. (3) Inadequate preparation. The key appears to be
the prevention of the first error, because if it is prevented
or reduced the other two may not occur. A problem to be over-
come is the rationalization of what an enemy can and cannot
do c For example, here are some commonly used rationalizations:
Surely an enemy would not do what we ourselves can not do;
Surely an enemy could not be doing what he is doing because
there are more economical and more efficient ways of accom-
plishing the same goals; Surely an enemy would not conduct
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his operations in the manner he is because that would only
duplicate what he has already done; Surely an enemy would
not do what he is doing because he could not be so evil.
The only factor that hinders surprise avoidance more
that rationalization is the "military overconfidence deriving
from the underestimation of the adversary's capability."
[Ref. 63] Only recently has the West considered the threat
from the Soviet arras build-up more than a challenge of quality
vice quantity. The Western view was that they may be behind
in numbers but they more than make up for it in superior tech-
nical quality. This is no longer the case and the West needs
to and has started to improve their armed forces and
capabilities
.
The Western world has a difficult task, for democratic
countries disapprove of aggression and therefore are more
cautious to act. They are always vulnerable to surprise
attacks. In democracies the key figures are political
leaders and there are very few who want to believe war is
imminent or are willing to accept the consequences of
ordering the necessary military measures before a war begins
and hence in crises situations their search for peace hinders
them from preventing a surprise attack.
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C. SURPRISE AVOIDANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS
"What is called "foreknowledge" cannot be elicited
from spirits, nor from Gods, nor by analogy with past
events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from
men who know the enemy situation."
Sun Tzu
5th Century B.C.
The history of mankind is full of confrontations in which
surprise was a dominant factor. However, the possibility of
being taken by surprise can be reduced, and it is certainly
possible to take steps that will moderate its effects if, in
spite of everything, it does occur.
There is a great disparity between what the Western world
thinks of as peace and the Soviets' concept. To the Soviets
peace is only one of the many conditions found in interna-
tional relationships whereby the socialist and the capitalist
elements are in a struggle using all the means available to
them short of war in order to accomplish their strategic
goals.
The Pentagon released in March 19 85 a publication which
confirmed this struggle by stating: "Cuba, Nicaragua and
the Soviet Union are now the principal threats to democracy
in Central America". [Ref. 64]
President Reagan echoed the same message to months later
when he accused the Soviets of trying to "spread their
dominance by force". [Ref. 65]
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The Soviets are geared for a short and violent war in
Europe. The Soviets believe the more time NATO has to
prepare for this war the chances for their . success diminishes.
The implication of this plus the transformation of Warsaw
Pact troops into a highly mobile fighting force gives credence
to surprise being a basic ingredient of Soviet strategy in
Europe.
Today many Western analysts believe that an attack by
the Soviets in Germany is extremely unlikely if not virtually
inconceivable. However, no one seems to have told this to
the Soviets for they continue to build, growing stronger and
more capable of carrying out what the West would want to
believe will never happen. The Soviets are scientific and
cautious by nature and if they think that what equipment and
men they have available is not enough to ensure a win then
they will wait and take the necessary time and steps until
the needed material is available. One can only hope that
these assumptions, beliefs and hopes of the Western analysts
do not act as filters to mask the critical intelligence
information needed to truly interpret Soviet behavior and
intentions. All too often the preconceptions of these men
doing the watching filter out the threat signals needed to
prevent this. In other words we believe what we want to
believe
.
If we accept the fact that warning signals at best are
going to be ambiguous then one must be capable of reacting
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repeatedly to these false alarms without going to war. As
was mentioned earlier, in democratic countries there is a
reluctance to do this. To say rapid, decisive and correct
decisions would be made even given sufficient warning in a
crisis is further compounded by the entangled systems of
alliances and government involved in NATO and the Western
world. Hopefully, when peace is really on the line the
delays we see in peacetime will be avoided. Unfortunately,
the historical record to date leaves one doubtful and
concerned
.
"We cannot count on strategic warning. We might get it
and we might be able to take useful preparatory action that
would be impossible without it ... However, since we cannot
rely on strategic warning, our defenses . . . must be designed
to function without it." [Ref. 66]
Counting on strategic warning for reasons stated earlier
is inherently dangerous. We must rely upon something other
than expecting to receive ample warning or to correctly inter-
pret a shift in Soviet intentions. We cannot depend upon our
leaders, who are constrained by many factors, to take the
proper precautionary measures in time. They just will not
have the luxury of abundant time in order to act. The
Western and democratic way is becoming its own worst enemy,
by continuing to accept the full political implications of
basing their strategy as well as their security and maybe
their very existence on the idea of receiving the timely
warning.
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The West may fear Soviet capabilities but apparently
they do not fear their intentions. This may be in part
due to the belief that war is such a remote possibility.
Yet this wishful thinking of war may also be the product
of the illusion that the West is immune to surprise.
Surprise on a large scale appears to be no longer frightful
to the West. P. H. Vigor in his book Soviet Blitzkrieg
Theory may provide an answer to why this menacing threat
goes almost totally ignored. He calls it his dead volcano
theory. Vigor explains: "Danger is that which moves ...
once it has remained motionless for a sufficient period, even
the most suspicious human will cease to worry about it. It
will have become not merely part of the landscape, but a
normal part of the landscape. And normalcy is not dangerous.
Normalcy is the familiar, the ordinary, the safe." [Ref. 67]
It would be much wiser to base one's strategy on what is
the enemy's capability to conduct an attack rather than base
it upon what the enemy professes are his intentions, espe-
cially if the potential enemy is the Soviet Union. A review
of the Soviet record of what they agreed to and said they
would do against what they actually did, would find a wide
disparity between the two. Intentions are relatively easy
for a country to change and it would only require a short
period of time to do so. It would be prudent not to defend
against these suspect intentions, but defend against an
attack that otherwise may not be expected. "There is no way
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to eliminate misperceptions = The world is too complex and
the available information too ambiguous for that." [Ref.
68]
"The more alert we are to deception, the more likely we
are to be deceived." [Ref. 69]
These two quotes appear to close the door on any options
that surprise could be avoided. This author believes that
surprise and its effects can be reduced if not eliminated
and if surprise does occur it can be dealt with.
The following are recommendations of how to minimize the
chances of being surprised:
/ (1) Know one's enemy, his style, his behavior and his
doctrine, being extremely careful not to color one's view
by mirror imaging.
(2) Reduce the influence and increase the flexibility of
working within a group or organization. Intelligence organi-
zations must allow and encourage skepticism, imagination and
diverse interpretations for this will aid the vigilance for
surprise. We must all be more open to evidence and ideas
that are in variance with our preconceptions.
(3) Lower the threshold of warning and increase the
tolerance of false alarms. Decisionmakers must encourage
their supportive intelligence organizations to take the
risk of false alarms. They should not be afraid, if the
odds and warning indicates, to go up to wake the President
at three o'clock in the morning and then have nothing happen
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The Congress and the press who can be unjustifiably
critical must be educated and instructed to understand
the reasons for these extra countermeasures, for it would
be far better to pay the price of several false alerts
than to suffer the consequences of a surprise attack.
(4) If there are false alerts and frequent mobilizations
there will be a tendency after a while to relax one's atten-
tion and alertness. One must be conscious of the effects
of cry-wolf syndrome and take creative and active measures
to avoid it.
(5) Improve the quality and style of the collection of
intelligence data. First remove the bias and misperceptions
.
This could be done in conjunction with item (2) above plus
the use of pluralistic intelligence systems that analyze the
same data, but more importantly present their separate views
to the decision-maker. Second, Intelligence officers must
get away from the monotonous presentation of only facts and
figures and offering answers their leaders want to hear.
They must be able to propose questions and scenarios to
enhance the decision-makers ' own thought process and to
cover the full range of possible uncertainties. Thirdly,
the political, military and intelligence communities must
have a closer relationship to allow for easier and freer flow
of information.
(6) The assumptions that form the National Strategic
plans, strategy and doctrines must be constantly reviewed,
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challenged and held suspect for changes and misinterpre-
tations brought on by misinformation or misperceptions
.
(7) Responses must fit the ambiguities of the information
at hand and minimize the risk of error and inaction. We
must be careful not to be nearsighted and pinned down in one
area and forget the rest of the world or cause one to miss
the proper warning signals. The United States has fallen
victim to these failures several times in the past. During
Pearl Harbor we were troubled with the war in Europe. During
the Hungarian crisis in 19 56 our attention was focused on the
problems in the Suez Canal. In 1968 Vietnam took our atten-
tion away from eastern Europe and Czechoslovakia. When the
Soviets were moving into Afghanistan the United States was
attempting to get its hostages out of Iran.
In several of these incidents there may not have been
much that the United States could have done but they might
have been able to do more. A second theme in concert with
this idea of being preoccupied elsewhere is the notion of
saying something that maybe should have been left unsaid.
For example, the Korean War might have been avoided if the
United States Secretary of State did not state that Korea
was outside the US's sphere of influence and protection only
to have several months later President Truman reverse this
position as hostilities increased. In the case of Hungary
the United States hurt its credibility by saying too much
and leaving the Hungarians nothing but empty promises . In
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both cases of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the United
States both formally and informally told the Soviets that
these two countries belonged to their sphere of influence
and they would not interfere militarily. To counter this
problem, "History suggest that it is more effective to say
very little - and even to make the Soviet leadership guess
what the response will be - than to be inconsistent."
[Ref. 70]
(8) Decision-makers must be careful not to be victims
of the belief that if only one received more information
than the probability of preventing surprise would increase.
As we have seen this rarely occurs and should not be relied
on.
(9) The need for security should never override the
need to have adequate communications between the decision-
makers and the commander in the field. To hold back informa-
tion for fear it would compromise the operation or the source
is inexcusable especially with today's reliance on rapid
communication and the need to know by the field commander.
(10) Surprise attacks are always possible, therefore one
must be prepared to fight under those conditions . Training
and exercises should be conducted that practice reacting to
surprise attacks. There should be practice of converting
warning signals into appropriate response actions. Through
exercises and war games a feel for what may become a reality
in the future can be obtained. During the 19 20 's and 30 's
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many Naval war games were played that involved scenarios
involving the Japanese in the Pacific. When World War II
occurred many of these same scenarios materialized and the
strategy and lessons learned from these games became the
battle plans and orders for actual combat operations . Even
more recently scenarios and exercises have become the pre-
planning and practice for operation in Grenada and the
strategy of the Persian Gulf. These games and exercises
are extremely valuable for they help prepare the means and
ways to combat and avoid surprise attacks and to minimize
its impact if successful.
(11) The Soviets are scientifically orientated and
cautious people. They ensure that the odds are in their
favor or they will wait until they are. They avoid risk
with the Western powers if at all possible. If the West
increased the number of options, both declaratory and
official, that were available in a crisis situation this
added risk would increase the Soviets uncertainty and
therefore cause the Soviets to wait and rethink their actions
(12) Because of the secretive nature of the Soviet Union
a big challenge to the West is to learn to work and deal
more precisely in an environment of uncertainty.
(13) If all else fails and in certain circumstances it
would be wise to have a strategy to be able to conduct a
pre-emptive attack as a precautionary measure to prevent
surprise. The best response to surprise is surprise.
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The above items are recommendations that can be done
to reduce or eliminate surprise. What follows is an
explanation of what can be done if in spite of all efforts
one is still surprised by an attack. Surprise by itself
can achieve nothing, it can only provide the advantageous
conditions whereby great achievements can be made possible.
If this advantageous condition is exploited to the maximum
by the initiator, the results can be catastrophic to the
victim. However, if the defender's strategy is well planned
and practiced he may be able to shift these conditions to
his advantage.
In order to do this the defender must be able to absorb
the initiator's surprise attack and be able to blunt his
momentum. To accomplish this task one must be supported
by a well-established and organized defense-in-depth strategy
and the trained troops to efficiently carry it out in an
environment where great pressure and confusion will be high.
The defenders must slow the advance of the attackers along
the axis of his breakthrough. This can be done by the
controlling of strategically key terrain, such as mountain
passes and river crossings and the effective use of artillery
and airpower. A major tactic to conduct once the above has
been accomplished and at the earliest possible time is to
counterattack and to go on the counterof fensive . As was
mentioned earlier, the best surprise is a countersurprise
.
Because of the rigid timetables that a Soviet war plan
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would be on, if one could drastically upset that schedule,
their tightly centralized command structure could be over-
burdened to compensate. The initiative could well be shifted
to the counterattacker at this point.
In closing two observations need to be made. First, if
one looks at the four major actions of the last forty years
that involved the Soviets and their successful use of surprise
attacks, one sees a unique occurrence. The four cases were
Manchuria in 1945, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968,
and Afghanistan in 1979. The unique pattern that these
cases produce are that they are almost on an eleven year
cycle. The implication of this pattern is that in the 1990 's
the next Soviet strike will occur. If this pattern was more
than a coincidence, a question that then would be necessary
to ask is, where would this attack occur?
The second observation is a summary of what America and
the Soviet Union are like. Alexis de Tocqueville made this
summary over one hundred and fifty years ago yet it still
holds true today.
"There are now two great nations in the world
which starting from different points, seem to advancing
toward the same goal: The Russians and the Anglo-Americans.
Both have grown in obscurity, and while the world's
attention was occupied elsewhere, they have suddenly taken
their place among the leading nations, making the world
take note of their birth and of their greatness almost
at the same instant.
All other peoples seems to have nearly reached their
natural limits and to need nothing but to preserve them;
but these two are growing. All the others have halted
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or advanced only through great exertions; they alone
march easily and quickly forward along a path whose
end no eye can yet see.
The American fights against natural obstacles; the
Russian is at grips with men. The former combats the
wilderness and barbarism; the latter, civilization with
all its arms. America's conquests are made with the
plowshare, Russia's with the sword.
To attain their aims, the former relies on personal
interest and gives free scope to the unguided strength
and common sense of individuals
.
The latter in a sense concentrates the whole power
of society in one man.
One has freedom as the principal means of action;
the other has servitude.
Their point of departure is different and their
paths diverse; nevertheless, each seems called by some
secret design of Providence one day to hold in its hands'
the destinies of half the world." [Ref. 71]
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